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THESIS’ ABSTRACT 
 
The positive psychology movement has grown out of recognition of an 
imbalance in medically oriented clinical psychology that focuses on studies of 
disorder and psychological damage. The movement aspires to encourage 
research in neglected areas of positive human experience. Also, the beginning 
of the positive clinical psychology faction has been announced. It aims to 
extend the scope of positive psychology research and practice onto individuals 
with psychological difficulties. Understanding and facilitating happiness is the 
core objective of positive psychology. 
 
In the present research, a correlational study examined the suppositions 
of the four-dimension model of happiness and psychological distress amongst 
people experiencing psychosis. The study‟s objective was to check how 
emotional distress resulting from psychosis affects the individuals‟ satisfaction 
with life. Forty-seven individuals with diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia 
completed self report measures of psychoticism, paranoid ideation, depression 
and anxiety (Brief Symptom Inventory), positive affect (Bradburn‟s Affect 
Balance Scale), and life satisfaction (Satisfaction With Life Scale). Correlational 
patterns of the four-dimension model of subjective wellbeing and psychological 
distress were replicated with people with experiences of psychosis. However, 
although the levels of depression and anxiety were clearly elevated in 
comparison with general population norms, the levels of positive affect 
remained similar to those in general public, and the average life satisfaction 
appeared only slightly decreased.  
 
Extended statistical analysis was conducted and the series of mediation 
analyses were carried out to examine whether the levels of depression, anxiety, 
and positive affect mediated the relationship between psychosis related 
distress and the individuals‟ satisfaction with life. The data were consistent with 
the dominant, indirect-only mediating role of depression. Possible explanations 
for the findings are proposed, and clinical and ethical implications from the 
applied positive psychology perspective are suggested. Study limitations are 
discussed and recommendations for future research are made. 
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RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
Satisfaction with Life in Psychosis: Clinical Examination of the Four-
Dimension Model of Happiness and Psychological Distress Amongst 
Individuals Diagnosed with Paranoid Schizophrenia. 
 
P.D. Mankiewicz1
a
, M. Gresswell
a
, & C. Turner
b
 
 
Abstract: A correlational study examined the suppositions of the four-
dimension model of happiness and psychological distress amongst 
people experiencing psychosis. The study‟s objective was to check how 
emotional distress resulting from psychosis affects the individuals‟ 
satisfaction with life. Forty-seven individuals with diagnoses of paranoid 
schizophrenia completed self report measures of psychoticism, paranoid 
ideation, depression and anxiety (Brief Symptom Inventory), positive 
affect (Affect Balance Scale), and life satisfaction (Satisfaction With Life 
Scale). Correlational patterns of the four-dimension model of subjective 
wellbeing and psychological distress were replicated with people with 
experiences of psychosis. However, although the levels of depression 
and anxiety were clearly elevated in comparison with general population 
norms, the levels of positive affect remained similar to those in general 
public, and the average life satisfaction appeared only slightly 
                                                             
1 Corresponding author: Pawel D. Mankiewicz. Email: p_mankiewicz@yahoo.com 
a
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, University of Lincoln, UK; 
 
b
Specialist Services for Psychosis, National Health Service, Lincoln, UK.  
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 6 of 135. 
 
decreased. Possible explanations for the findings were proposed and 
clinical implications from the positive clinical psychology perspective 
were suggested. Study limitations were discussed. 
 
Keywords: positive clinical psychology; happiness; satisfaction with life; 
positive affect; psychosis. 
 
Introduction 
 
Happiness is the most central concern for positive psychology (Peterson, 
2006). Subjective wellbeing (SWB) has often been used as a general 
definition and synonym of happiness (Noddings, 2003), which implies that 
happiness is intrinsically about subjective and individual experience (Nettle, 
2005). Therefore, happiness is perceived as a positive subjective state 
defined by the individual who believes that his/her life and current events are 
going well (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008). 
 
Empirical studies on SWB have consistently suggested that happiness 
has at least two integral aspects: affect, which represents the emotional 
experience of joy, and cognition, which represents evaluation of satisfaction 
with life (Carr, 2004). Nettle (2005) proposed that happiness might be 
understood on three different mutually interacting levels: level 1 consists of 
momentary feelings, such as joy and pleasure, level 2 involves judgements 
about feelings and life (individual life satisfaction), and level 3 consists of 
general subjective quality of life and flourishing. Joy is the most immediate 
and direct sense of happiness and is brought on by a desired state being 
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attained; there is little cognition involved beyond the recognition that the 
desired event has occurred (Nettle, 2005). Happiness, however, is not 
identical to short-term sensory pleasure, to which individuals quickly 
habituate (Peterson & Park, 2009).  
 
Headey and Wearing (1992) argued that majority of people, regardless 
of their socio-economic status, feel fairly happy with their lives. The authors 
proposed that every individual in any stable life situation, that is in the 
absence of major life changes, arrives at an equilibrium state in which 
present life is viewed as being almost as satisfying as the life a person 
expects. In equilibrium state, the present life is regarded as considerably 
better than the worst previous period in one‟s life and than the life of an 
average person in one‟s community. Consequently, high average levels of 
SWB appear to be located within a set of perceptions, aspirations and 
expectancies (Headey & Wearing, 1991). “Human beings construct their 
world to arrive at a psychologically consistent set of perceptions – an 
equilibrium state – which supports or bolsters a feeling of wellbeing” (p. 8). 
Furthermore, a dynamic equilibrium theory (Headey, 2006) proposed that 
following even such positive or negative major life events as winning a large 
sum in a lottery or becoming seriously ill, people quickly habituate to their 
new circumstances and return to their equilibrium state of happiness. 
 
Hence, when people say they are happy, it does not mean that they are 
literally joyful all the time (Nettle, 2005). The process of overall self-appraisal 
of one‟s life is involved, and the degree to which an individual judges the 
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perceived quality of his/her life favourably results in different levels of life 
satisfaction (Veenhoven, 1991). This process may occur implicitly or explicitly 
(Andrews & Withey, 1974). Diener and Lucas (2000) explained that life 
satisfaction is the function of people‟s evaluation of how they are doing in 
their lives generally, especially in the domains that are important to them. 
Each individual evaluates his/her life differently depending on their 
expectations, values and previous experiences. Thus, research on SWB 
should be focused on idiosyncratic assessment of individuals‟ thoughts and 
feelings about their lives (Diener & Lucas, 2000). Therefore, Diener and 
Biswas-Diener (2008) advocated that to measure life satisfaction the exact 
standards for happiness should be left up to the individual. Despite this 
idiosyncratic approach, self-reports of happiness appear highly reliable and 
agree significantly with observers ratings, diary methods and behavioural 
measures (Peterson & Park, 2009). 
 
However, judgements of life satisfaction are not merely a function of 
what one thinks about one‟s life, but also of how one feels at the time of 
judgemental processes (Veenhoven, 1991). Schwarz and Strack (1991) 
argued that since moods increase the accessibility of mood congruent 
information in memory, then if positive affect dominates at the time of the 
judgement, the selective retrieval of positive cognitions will result in an 
upbeat evaluation of one‟s life satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction with life 
appears partially dependent on an individual‟s emotional state (Lewinsohn, 
Redner & Seeley, 1991). Currently, positive psychology research (e.g. Diener 
& Lucas, 2000; Argyle, 2001) seems to support the assumption that positive 
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emotions are not merely the polar opposite of negative moods but these two 
dimensions are at least partially independent and coexist with each other. 
Neurophysiological evidence indicating that the brain centres registering 
positive affect and negative affect are separate appears to support this 
assumption (Kahneman, 1999). It has been repeatedly demonstrated that in 
frontal zones, a differential lateralisation for positive and negative emotions 
exist, with relative left-hemispheric activation for positive emotions and 
relative right-hemispheric activation for negative emotions (Natale, Gur & 
Gur, 1983; Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; Alves, Fukusima, & Aznar-Casanova, 
2008). These structures, however, have been shown to work together to 
process and generate emotional information and emotional behaviour 
(Huppert, 2005). Furthermore, Posner, Russell and Peterson (2005) 
demonstrated that although relative lateralisation for positive and negative 
emotions has been supported with empirical research, a strictly dimensional 
neuroanatomical continuum does not exist, as all affective states arise from 
coexisting and overlapping neurophysiological systems. 
 
Headey and Wearing (1991) provided evidence that some amount of 
psychological distress can occur alongside moderately high general levels of 
happiness. Therefore, SWB was assumed to consist of at least three 
dimensions: positive affect, life satisfaction and negative affect. In their 
subsequent publication, Headey and Wearing (1992) argued that negative 
affect should be subdivided further, as the authors demonstrated that 
depression and anxiety, the two main forms of psychological distress, were at 
least partly independent and both were major influences on SWB. The 
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authors reported that the measures of depression and anxiety were only 
moderately correlated, and that while individuals could be satisfied with their 
lives and anxious, it was rare to find people who were satisfied and 
depressed. Both depression and anxiety were shown to be significant 
indicators of SWB through their inverse effect on a sense of satisfaction, and 
on frequency of positive emotions. 
 
Thus, Headey and Wearing (1992) proposed a four-dimension model of 
SWB and psychological distress. The four reciprocally interacting factors 
were: life satisfaction, positive affect, depression, and anxiety. Based on data 
collected from their Australian general population study, the authors 
established observed correlations between the four dimensions, as 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Observed correlations between four dimensions of subjective well-being 
and psychological distress. 
Note: Reproduced with permission from “Understanding Happiness” by B. Headey 
and A. Wearing, 1992, p. 33. 
 
 
life satisfaction 
 
depression 
 
anxiety 
 
positive affect (joy) 
+ 0.40 
+ 0.50 
- 0.52 - 0.17 
- 0.25 - 0.34 
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Given this model, it seemed important that clinicians working with 
individuals with psychosis know how it applies to their patients, in order to 
inform finding possible means to maximise their satisfaction with life. 
 
Diagnostic descriptions of psychosis 
 
Psychosis has typically been described using a symptomatological approach. 
The characteristic symptoms of psychosis have been divided into two major 
clusters: positive and negative symptoms. Positive symptoms are 
pathological by their presence (Barrowclough & Tarrier, 1997) and include 
hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder and cognitive processing 
abnormalities (Early, Haller, Posner & Raichle, 1997). Negative symptoms 
refer to deficits in functioning and may include restricted emotional 
expression, impoverished speech, inattention, lack of motivation, apathy, 
poor concentration, social withdrawal, lowered activity levels, and avolition 
(Johns, Sellwood, McGovern & Haddock, 2002). Sass and Parnas (2003) 
theorised the existence of a third separate category of symptoms of 
psychosis, which they labelled „disorganisation‟ syndrome comprising 
abnormalities in the organisation of thought, speech and attention. 
 
Diagnostic guidelines of the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders (World Health Organisation [WHO], 1992) necessitate 
the presence of a minimum of one very clear positive symptom (such as 
delusions of control or hallucinatory voices) for most of the time during a 
period of 1 month or more, as the prime requirement for a diagnosis of 
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schizophrenia. Additionally, paranoid delusions of persecution and/or 
prominent threatening or commanding hallucinations must be present in 
order to satisfy diagnostic criteria for paranoid schizophrenia (WHO, 1992). 
Negative symptoms do not dominate in the clinical picture. (Please see 
sections on Psychosis Paradigms, page 50, and Diagnostic Descriptions of 
Psychosis – Critical Remarks, page 56, for further information.) 
 
Emotional distress in psychosis 
 
Psychological distress has been acknowledged in most aetiological models 
of psychosis (Corcoran et al., 2003) and severe symptoms of depression and 
anxiety were found prevalent amongst people with chronic psychotic illness 
(Scheller-Gilkey, Thomas, Woolwine & Miller, 2002). The prevalence of 
psychiatric comorbidity was found as high as 57.3%, of which approximately 
62% of people were found to have some form of anxiety disorder (Good, 
2002). Siris (1991) reviewed 29 studies describing the incidence and 
prevalence of secondary depression in psychosis, and concluded that its 
occurrence amongst patients diagnosed with schizophrenia ranged to as 
many as 70% of studied cases. In addition, his review highlighted that the 
personal wellbeing of depressed psychotic patients was lower, they tended to 
experience more auditory hallucinations and suicidal ideations, they had 
lower self-esteem, and were more self-critical and hopeless. 
 
Evidence suggests that higher levels of psychological distress correlate 
with experiencing positive symptoms of psychosis, especially auditory 
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hallucinations, as dominating, insulting and commanding (Vaughan & Fowler, 
2004). Norman and Malla (1991) reported that high levels of depression and 
anxiety were associated with hallucinations and delusions but not with 
negative symptoms. Also, studies reviewed by Bentall (2003) suggested that 
positive symptoms of psychosis, such as paranoid ideations, were 
accompanied by emotional distress, such as dysphoria and anxiety. 
 
Cognitive models of psychosis suggest that depression and anxiety do 
not arise directly from positive symptoms of psychosis but rather from an 
individual‟s interpretation of those symptoms and personal meanings 
attached to those experiences (Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995). Perhaps, 
the clearest cognitive framework for experiences such as delusions or 
hallucinations, has been based on Ellis‟ A-B-C model, where A stands for 
„activating event‟, B stands for „belief‟ about activating event, and C stands 
for „consequences‟ of holding a particular belief, including emotional, 
behavioural and physiological reactions (Dudley & Kuyken, 2006). Within the 
A-B-C framework, hallucinations are the activating events (As), which are 
interpreted and appraised by an individual (Bs). These interpretations might 
be delusional or paranoid in their content, and subsequently trigger 
associated emotional reactions (Cs), such as anxiety or depression 
(Chadwick et al., 1996). Hence, following the cognitive framework, the 
appraisal of unusual experiences appears to play the critical role in 
determining whether or not an individual arrives at a delusional interpretation 
of a hallucinatory experience (Steel, 2008). 
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Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington (2002) proposed that 
the reactions of emotional distress in psychosis could be additionally divided 
into: (1) delusional distress, a primary distress arising directly from the 
content of a psychotic experience, and (2) depression and anxiety, a 
secondary distress arising from further appraisal of the experience in the light 
of individual beliefs. The cognitive content of emotions is hypothesised to be 
expressed in a symptom of psychosis, such as delusional beliefs, which in 
turn directly contributes to the exacerbation of distress. Subsequently, 
anxiety will arise from the threat belief, while depression will be associated 
with beliefs about the power of the persecutors, personal failure and 
deserved punishment (Freeman et al., 2002). 
 
Overall, the picture of emotional experiences in psychosis appears to 
be negative and pessimistic. This may suggest that the levels of positive 
affect and life satisfaction amongst individuals diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia might be considerably lower in comparison to the general 
population. (Please see section on Emotional Distress in Psychosis, page 51, 
for further information.) 
 
Positive approaches to psychosis 
 
Psychological deficits and disability have traditionally been the focus of 
clinical psychology, which has rarely prioritised clients‟ resilience and 
resourcefulness, whereas the movement of positive psychology has aimed to 
generate an empirical knowledge base focusing on human strengths which 
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would complement the deficit-based traditional stance (Carr, 2005). The 
neglect of well-being within the field of clinical psychology might be explained 
by its long-established focus on people with severe psychological difficulties 
which in practice often means tackling problems and reducing distress rather 
than promoting subjective satisfaction (Conway & MacLeod, 2002). Even 
though examples of studies describing successfully implemented 
interventions and their positive impact on wellbeing of people with psychosis 
have been available in clinical literature (Bryson, Lysaker & Bell, 2002), 
Braehler and Harper (2008) still reported that quality of life of patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia remained low. 
 
Although, Romme (1993) argued that intervention and rehabilitation for 
people with psychosis should focus on enhancing all fundamental qualities of 
their lives, the empirical studies on the subject of SWB in psychosis appear 
underrepresented in comparison with psychopathologically oriented clinical 
research. Therefore, a need for a more positive approach to psychotic 
experiences was identified by Chadwick (1997), who argued that people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia have strengths as well as deficits, and that 
psychology has to focus on these capacities to increase dignity and life 
quality of people with psychosis. James (2001) suggested that overcoming a 
sense of powerlessness might be one of the factors contributing to the 
increase in SWB of people with psychosis. More recent and positive 
approaches to the education of mental health practitioners advocated for 
delivering a thorough training in combating discrimination towards people 
suffering from severe psychological difficulties, focusing on their human 
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qualities and encouraging their hope (Houghton, Shaw, Hayward & West, 
2006). 
 
From the perspective of positive clinical psychology, as proposed by 
Joseph and Linley (2006), the role of mental health practitioners is not only to 
alleviate distress and treat symptoms, but also to facilitate wellbeing, promote 
health and build strengths. (Please see section on the Positive Psychology 
and Positive Clinical Psychology Movements, page 44, for further 
information.) Thus, we argue that as a part of the change advocated by the 
positive clinical psychology movement, we need to establish whether 
individuals with psychosis experience happiness in the way that people from 
general population do. Hence, our study aimed to examine the applicability of 
the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress with people 
experiencing psychosis. 
 
The present study 
 
A correlational study was conducted to examine the suppositions of the four-
dimension model amongst individuals diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia. (Please see sections on Extended Rationale for the Study, 
page 59, and Choice of Research Design and Study Model, page 61, for 
further information.) Our research question was how emotional distress 
resulting from psychosis affects the individuals‟ satisfaction with life. In Stage 
1 of our analysis, we hypothesised that the correlational patterns proposed 
by the four-dimension model of happiness and psychological distress would 
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be replicated with people experiencing psychosis (Hypothesis 1). If the model 
was replicated, in Stage 2, we hypothesised that primary distress resulting 
directly from the experiences of psychosis would be positively correlated with 
the anxiety and depression dimensions of the model (Hypothesis 2), and 
inversely correlated with the dimensions of positive affect and life satisfaction 
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, we predicted that the presence of psychosis would be 
accompanied by heightened levels of depression and anxiety in comparison 
to the general population norms (Hypothesis 4), decreased levels of positive 
affect (Hypothesis 5), and consequently, reduced life satisfaction (Hypothesis 
6). 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
In our study, 47 participants were recruited from mental health specialist in-
patient wards and out-patient clinics around National Health Services Trusts 
in the Midlands UK. Participants were aged from 18 years to above 60, had 
capacity to give informed consent, and were diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia. 
 
Of the 42 participants who provided demographic information, 31 were 
men and 11 were women. 39 were of White British, 2 of White Irish and 1 of 
Black British Caribbean origin. 29 participants were out-patients and 13 in-
patients. Most participants were single, 4 were married and 4 divorced. 32 
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participants were unemployed, 3 part-time and 1 full-time employed, 3 were 
students, and 2 were homemakers and carers. (Please see sections on 
Participants‟ Demographic Data, page 70, and Sampling Method and Sample 
Size, page 62, for further information.) 
 
Ethical approval 
 
Ethical approval was granted from the regional Research Ethics Committee 
(REC) Nottingham 1 regulated by a statutory research governance 
framework (see Appendix H). Research & development approval was 
obtained from the local Trusts in Midlands UK (see Appendixes I and J). 
 
Measures 
 
The intensity of psychosis, depression and anxiety symptoms were 
operationalized through the self-reported levels of distress they caused to an 
individual, and were measured by the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 
1993). Positive affect, defined as joy or enjoyment, was measured the Affect 
Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969). Satisfaction with life was defined as a 
cognitive appraisal of an individual‟s quality of life and was measured by the 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985). 
(Please see sections on Choice of Measures, page 64, and Measurement of 
Happiness, page 65, for further information.) 
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Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
 
The BSI is a 53-item self-report inventory, which has been designed to reflect 
the psychological complaint patterns amongst mental health in-patients and 
community out-patients. Each BSI item is rated on a five-point scale (0-4) 
reflecting a person‟s distress from “not at all” to “extremely”. The BSI is a 
measure of current psychological symptom status and is scored on nine 
primary symptom dimensions, which are: somatisation, obsessive-
compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic 
anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (Derogatis, 1993).  
 
The BSI appears to have satisfactory psychometric properties. 
Normative samples for BSI included 1002 adult psychiatric outpatients, 974 
adult non-patients, 423 adult psychiatric inpatients, and 2408 adolescent 
non-patients. Internal consistency was established using Cronbach alpha 
coefficients for all nine dimensions, which ranged from 0.71 to 0.85, while 
test-retest reliability coefficients were estimated between 0.68 and 0.91 
(Derogatis, 1993). Internal structure and construct validity was found to be 
sufficient: orthogonal varimax loadings determined from principal 
components analysis ranged from 0.35 to 0.71. Convergent and discriminant 
validity was examined through comparison with the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory; correlation coefficients scoped from 0.31 to 0.72 
(Derogatis, 1993). The BSI has been standardised and normalised for British 
population (Francis, Rajan & Turner, 1990; Ryan, 2007). 
 
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 20 of 135. 
 
The BSI subscales scored for the purpose of this study were 
depression, anxiety, psychoticism, and paranoid Ideation. The primary 
distress resulting directly from the experiences of psychosis was measured 
with the subscales of psychoticism and paranoid ideation. Derogatis and 
Melisaratos (1983) described the subscale of psychoticism as representing a 
continuum progressing from a mild interpersonal alienation to a floridly 
psychotic state, and consisting of the first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, 
including experiences of thought control. The paranoid ideation subscale 
represented paranoid mode of thinking consisting of thoughts of projection, 
hostility, suspiciousness, centrality, and fear of loss of autonomy (Derogatis & 
Melisaratos, 1983). The content of the both subscales combined appeared 
consistent with the diagnostic criteria for the diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia (WHO, 1992), as described earlier in the article. Therefore 
combined scores from both subscales were used to measure individual 
distress arising directly from the symptoms of psychosis, i.e. delusional 
distress. The BSI subscales of depression and anxiety were scored to 
measure emotional distress arising from further appraisal of experiences of 
psychosis, which also formed the psychological distress elements of the four-
dimension model. 
 
Affect Balance Scale (ABS) 
 
The ABS is a 10-item rating scale containing Positive Affect Scale (PAS, five 
statements reflecting positive feelings) and Negative Affect Scale (NAS, five 
statements reflecting negative feelings). The statements are presented in a 
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„yes‟ or „no‟ format. PAS questions receive a rating of 1 for „yes‟ and 0 for 
„no‟, whereas NAS ratings are reversed. The affect balance score is 
computed by subtracting negative affect scores from positive affect scores 
and adding a constant of 5 to avoid negative scores. The whole set of ten 
questions can be administered in less than 5 minutes (Bradburn, 1969). For 
the purpose of this research only the PAS scores were used. 
 
The ABS has shown to have good internal reliability: alpha coefficient 
was reported to be 0.72 by Devins, Beiser, Dion, Pelletier and Edwards 
(1997), and 0.74 by Godoy-Izquierdo, Martinez and Godoy (2008). Test-
retest reliability of the ABS was established as 0.76 (Ryff, 1989). Factorial 
invariance resulted with the following outcomes: adjusted goodness-of-fit 
value was 0.98, and its Bentler and Bonett Index estimated as 0.91 (Devins 
et al., 1997). The ABS was also reported to show a convergent validity with 
other measures of related constructs, such as Depression-Happiness Scale 
(Lewis, McCollam, & Joseph, 2000). The following psychometric properties 
were described for the PAS: test-retest reliability was established as 0.83 
(Ryff, 1989), Cronbach alpha coefficient was found to be 0.82 (Godoy-
Izquierdo et al., 2008), and convergent validity with other single-item 
indicators of happiness ranged from 0.34 to 0.38 (Lewis et al., 2000). 
 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) 
 
The SWLS contains five items rated on 7-point scale, from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”, reflecting a client‟s appraisal of his/her 
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subjective well-being. Total scores fall into one of the levels of satisfaction, 
from “extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied” (Peterson, 2006). For 
the purpose of this study, the total scores were used. 
 
Normative data has been established on a diverse (and cross-cultural) 
population, including psychiatric inpatients, psychotherapy clients, prisoners, 
persons suffering from physical disabilities, older adults, and students. The 
SWLS demonstrated strong internal reliability and temporal stability: 
coefficient alpha for the scale was 0.87, and a 2-month stability coefficient 
was established as 0.82 (Diener et al., 1985). Over longer time periods, the 
test-retest reliability decreased to a level of 0.54, which demonstrated that 
although the SWLS had a temporal stability property (up to four years), yet 
has proven to hold sufficient sensitivity to detect change in life satisfaction 
during, for example, a course of intervention (Pavot & Diener, 1993). The 
SWLS was also reported to have high validity. For example, the loading of 
Compton‟s happiness factor has been established as high as 0.83 (Argyle, 
2001). As presented by Pavot and Diener (1993), correlation of SWLS with 
other self report and non-self report measures of subjective well-being and 
satisfaction was found to range from 0.28 (informant reports) to 0.68 (e.g. 
Andrews/Withey Scale). Furthermore, item-total correlations were reported to 
range between 0.57 and 0.75 (Argyle, 2001). 
 
Procedure 
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The recruitment and assessment to the current study was conducted entirely 
by the clinical psychologists from among clients with whom they already had 
an established therapeutic relationship and working alliance. Clinical 
psychologists determined whether a particular client within their caseloads 
met the inclusion criteria for the research. Those who agreed to take part 
were then asked to sign a consent form and complete the questionnaires. 
The measures were administered with the participants by their psychologists 
in a fixed order: BSI, PAS and SWLS. Completion of the full assessment set 
took approximately 15-20 minutes. (Please see sections on Study Procedure, 
page 66, and Ethical Considerations, page 67, for further information.) 
 
Results 
 
Stage 1 
 
The levels of depression and anxiety were demonstrated to correlate 
positively (r = 0.667, sig < 0.001) with each other. Satisfaction with life was 
shown to be positively correlated with positive affect (r = 0.418, sig = 0.003) 
and inversely correlated with depression (r = -0.473, sig < 0.001) and anxiety 
(r = -0.394, sig = 0.003). Positive affect was also demonstrated to inversely 
correlate with depression (r = -0.274, sig = 0.031) and with anxiety (r = -
0.169, sig = 0.129). The latter correlation was low and statistically non-
significant. This finding seemed understandable in the light of previous 
research which demonstrated that it was not uncommon for an individual to 
be both anxious and joyful (Headey & Wearing, 1992). Furthermore, these 
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findings remain in agreement with a cognitive model of depression and more 
contemporary theories of happiness. In depression, negative and self-
defeating cognitions are unconditional and overgeneralised affecting an 
individual‟s perception of one‟s whole life (Sanders & Wills, 2005). This does 
not seem to leave much space for positive and joyful experiences. Whereas, 
as argued by Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 2002) in the theory of optimal 
experiences, heightened levels of anxiety often precipitate and accompany 
the experiences of enjoyment. Hence, low and statistically non-significant 
reversed correlation between anxiety and positive affect. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the results of Pearson‟s 1-tailed r correlation 
coefficients, as applied to the study model. 
 
 
                                                                             (- 0.473) 
                (0.716)                                       (- 0.274)                                         
                                                           
                                (- 0.219)                                                   (0.418) 
                                         (0.667) 
                  (0.721)                  (- 0.169)               
                                                                     (-0.394) 
                                           
            (-0.349) 
 
Figure 2. Pearson 1-tailed r correlation coefficients between the study model 
dimensions. 
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Life satisfaction 
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The findings supported our initial prediction (Hypothesis 1). The 
correlational patterns of the four-dimension model of happiness and 
psychological distress established for general population were replicated with 
people experiencing psychosis. Correlation significance levels are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Pearson 1-tailed r correlation coefficients‟ significance levels within the study model. 
Study model 
dimensions 
P&PI* Depression Anxiety Positive 
affect 
Life 
satisfaction 
P&PI* --- < 0.001 < 0.001 0.069 0.008 
Depression < 0.001 --- < 0.001 0.031 < 0.001 
Anxiety < 0.001 < 0.001 --- 0.129 0.003 
Positive affect 0.069 0.031 0.129 --- 0.003 
Life satisfaction 0.008 < 0.001 0.003 0.003 --- 
Note: (*) Psychoticism & paranoid ideation. 
 
Stage 2 
 
The levels of psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to be strongly 
positively correlated with the dimensions of depression (r = 0.716, sig < 
0.001) and anxiety (r = 0.721, sig < 0.001) within the four-dimension model 
(Hypothesis 2). The intensity of psychoticism and paranoid ideation was 
demonstrated to be reversely correlated with the dimension of life satisfaction 
(-0.349, sig = 0.008), and was found to show a reversed correlation with 
positive affect (Hypothesis 3), though statistically non-significant (r = -0.219, 
sig = 0.069). 
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Table 2 presents descriptive sample statistics and general population 
norms for the study model dimensions. As predicted (Hypothesis 4), the 
sample average levels of depression and anxiety were both increased by at 
least 1 SD in comparison with the community norms. Given the correlational 
patterns reported in stage 1, the finding appears consistent with the study 
model, since the sample levels of psychoticism were increased by 
approximately 2 SD and the levels of paranoid ideation were heightened by 
approximately 1.5 SD from the norms. Our sample mean for the positive 
affect dimension was similar to British general population mean. Hence, 
contrary to our prediction (Hypothesis 5), the participants exhibited the 
average levels of positive affect. However, the sample mean score on SWLS 
was placed within „slightly dissatisfied‟ range of scores. In comparison, 
normative data described by Diener et al. (1985) reported that the non-
clinical population mean falls within „slightly satisfied‟ score range. 
Consequently, our sample‟s satisfaction with life was reduced by 
approximately 1 SD in comparison with general population trend. This result 
supported our prediction (Hypothesis 6). 
 
(Please see sections on Descriptive Statistics, page 71, Normality of 
Distribution Tests, page 72, and Extended Statistical Investigation – 
Mediation Analyses, page 76, for further information.) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive sample statistics and normative data for the study model dimensions. 
Study model dimensions  Mean Standard deviation 
Psychoticism sample statistics 1.57 0.93 
BSI norms* 0.27 0.48 
Paranoid ideation sample statistics 1.48 1.04 
BSI norms* 0.54 0.65 
Depression sample statistics 1.58 1.04 
BSI norms* 0.42 0.65 
Anxiety sample statistics 1.48 0.99 
BSI norms* 0.45 0.60 
Positive affect sample statistics 2.96 1.73 
ABS norms** 2.84 Not reported 
Life satisfaction sample statistics 16.40 7.11 
SWLS norms*** 23.50 6.43 
Note: (*) British non-patient norms reported by Francis et al. (1990). 
(**) British non-clinical norms reported by Basabe et al. (2000). 
(***) Non-clinical norms reported by Diener et al. (1985). 
 
Discussion and study limitations 
 
Campbell (2007) reported a number of studies describing how people with 
experiences of psychosis felt trapped within a negative professional 
framework, which in their opinion encouraged the dismissal of significant 
aspects of their experience, and appeared stigmatising and discriminatory. In 
our investigation, we attempted to pursue a positive approach to studying 
happiness in psychosis, and to extend the focus of positive psychology 
research onto individuals with severe mental health difficulties. 
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We tested the suppositions of the four-dimension model of SWB and 
psychological distress amongst people diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia. The results supported most of the stated hypotheses and 
indicated that the four-factor model could be successfully utilised to gain 
some understanding of underlying emotional processes affecting life 
satisfaction of individuals with experiences of psychosis. Since the 
correlations between the dimensions of life satisfaction, positive affect, 
depression and anxiety were similar to those reported by Headey and 
Wearing (1992) for the original model, it might be concluded that the four-
factor model of SWB and psychological distress applies not only to 
individuals from non-clinical population, but also to people with severe mental 
health difficulties, such as psychosis. This finding seems very important, 
since it indicates that the experiences of SWB amongst people diagnosed 
with paranoid schizophrenia, the most severe form of psychosis, appear to 
be governed by mechanisms similar to those of general population. 
Moreover, a range of the sample scores on the dimensions of positive affect 
and life satisfaction indicated that individuals experiencing psychosis may 
even feel very joyful and extremely satisfied with their lives. 
 
However, in comparison with generally slightly satisfied non-clinical 
population trends, participants of our study appeared on average slightly 
dissatisfied with their lives. Given the study model, we argue that it is the 
emotional distress accompanying experiences of psychosis that accounts for 
this dissatisfaction, rather than the objective presence or absence of 
symptoms specific for paranoid schizophrenia. As depicted in Figure 2, 
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elevated levels of psychoticism and paranoid ideation clearly correlated with 
depression and anxiety dimensions within the model, and resulted in 
heightened levels of both dimensions in comparison to the general population 
norms. Consequently, increased levels of depression and anxiety were 
accompanied by reduced satisfaction with life amongst individuals 
experiencing psychosis. 
 
Given the above findings, it seems logical that in order to enhance 
satisfaction with life of a person with psychosis, psychological interventions 
should focus primarily on reducing symptoms of depression and anxiety. And 
traditional clinical psychology that emphasises the alleviation of emotional 
distress may offer exactly these interventions: psychological therapies for 
depression and anxiety. Yet, positive psychology offers an alternative that 
complements the traditional deficit-based approach. 
 
Interestingly, our sample levels of positive affect were similar to those 
reported in general population. We propose that because of those levels of 
positive affect (despite clearly elevated experiences of depression and 
anxiety), the average satisfaction with life reported in the sample was only 
slightly lowered in comparison with population trends. The explanation for 
this surprising finding might be found within the four-factor model itself which 
originally suggested that positive and negative affect are separate and only 
moderately correlated entities (Headey & Wearing, 1992). Furthermore, as 
proposed by the dynamic equilibrium theory (Headey & Wearing, 1991), 
every individual in any stable life situation, that is in the absence of major life 
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changes, arrives at an equilibrium state (psychologically consistent set of 
perceptions that bolster individual SWB), in which present life is viewed as 
being almost as satisfying as a person expects and considerably better than 
the worst previous period in one‟s life. Following even such a negative major 
life event as on onset of a serious illness, most people habituate to their new 
circumstances and return to their equilibrium state of happiness (Headey, 
2006). It therefore appears that individuals diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia are able to adapt to such disconcerting and unsettling 
experiences as onset of psychosis or admission to acute or secure wards, 
and return to their equilibrium states.  
 
Furthermore, in their positive mood set-point theory, Diener and Diener 
(1996) proposed that there is a positive, rather than neutral, baseline for 
affect in human beings, which has significant adaptive, evolutional, 
motivational, social, learning and intrinsic functions. For instance, positive 
moods give negative events maximum informational value and therefore they 
can be easily noticed and quickly attended to. Also, it is pertinent for 
motivational reasons that people are not in a negative mood most of the time. 
Positive moods energise approach tendencies and these must prevail in 
human behaviour in order to obtain food, shelter, social contact, sex and so 
forth. Although the exact set-point varies amongst individuals depending on a 
person‟s socialisation and temperament, for most people it remains in the 
positive range (Diener & Diener, 1996). 
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Subsequently, a positive clinical psychology practice may offer 
strengths-based interventions that focus on amplifying an individual‟s 
experiences of joy and on increasing a person‟s satisfaction with life. Joseph 
and Linley (2006) argued that positive clinical psychologists identify human 
strengths and promote mental health as assets which buffer against mental 
illness through educational, relational and social interventions. The four-
factor model seems to depict clearly how the enhanced levels of joy and life 
satisfaction may operate as buffers against psychological distress. However, 
the model does not appear to suggest what exactly might be done in order to 
increase an individual‟s SWB from the positive psychology perspective. 
Neither does the dynamic equilibrium theory. Indeed, the model seems to 
imply that the levels of both depression and anxiety ought to be reduced to 
increase a person‟s happiness, which appears to be consistent with 
traditional medically oriented stance. The dynamic equilibrium theory, on the 
other hand, suggests that if left on his/her own an individual would sooner or 
later return to the equilibrium levels of SWB. These inconsistencies with the 
positive clinical psychology position seem to be the major limitation of the 
study. 
 
Some guidance for psychological interventions from the perspective of 
positive clinical psychology can be found in an alternative theory of 
happiness, such as the theory of optimal experience developed and 
described in detail by Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997, 2002). The theory 
proposes that the states of happiness may be achieved through engagement 
with everyday life and through involvement in absorbing tasks, such as work 
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or leisure activities, in which a person exercises individual strengths, talents 
and interests. The engagement, involvement and absorption in activities that 
an individual does for their own sake leads to unique harmony and order in 
consciousness. This „optimal experience‟ or „flow‟ helps an individual to 
develop and cultivate an optimistic perception of oneself and the future. 
These theoretical propositions informed the practical recommendations that 
Carr (2005) gave to mental health professionals aspiring to pursue positive 
psychology approach in their practice. For instance, the author suggested 
that “clinicians may help clients identify their talents and explore ways to use 
these frequently to generate flow experiences” (p. 5). Given the crucial role 
that enjoyment, activities, hobbies and work play in the recovery and quality 
of life of people with enduring mental health difficulties (Pathfinder Hearing 
Voices Group, 1999; Bryson et al., 2002), the practical recommendations 
deriving from the theory of optimal experience appear consistent with the 
needs of individuals experiencing psychosis. 
 
Another limitation of the study model was that it did not offer any 
explanation of why individuals with psychosis often react with heightened 
levels of psychological distress. For conceptual purposes, we have taken a 
cognitive perspective on this matter (Fowler et al., 1995). Cognitive models of 
psychosis propose that it is not a delusional or hallucinatory symptom in itself 
that accounts for emotional distress of the individual experiencing psychosis. 
It is rather the individual‟s appraisal or interpretation of that experience that 
triggers a particular emotional reaction (Chadwick, Birchwood & Trower, 
1996). For instance, when an individual experiences a threatening auditory 
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hallucination, s/he might think s/he is being persecuted and, as the result of 
this thought, starts feeling anxious. Consequently, given the four-factor model 
of SWB and psychological distress, the person‟s levels of joy and life 
satisfaction are assumed to be negatively affected. (Please see section on 
Cognitive Model of Psychosis, page 53, for further information.) 
 
Finally, we did not consider any external objective indicators that might 
influence a person‟s quality of life. We are aware of the debate on the subject 
of importance of objective indicators that continues to take place in the 
positive psychology literature. We however support the opinion that the main 
weakness of objective factors, as explained by Argyle (2001), is that we do 
not know which to choose, as different people have different hierarchies of 
values. There is also a problem of finding equivalent measures in different 
countries. Veenhoven (1991) argued that happiness relates more strongly to 
psychological variables than to socio-economic indicators, whilst Argyle and 
Martin (1991) pinpointed that the effect of objective indicators on subjective 
satisfaction has often been found statistically non-significant. Schwarz and 
Strack (1991) reported that most objective life circumstances account for less 
than 5% of the variance in measures of SWB and the combination of a dozen 
objective domains of life accounts for less that 10%. The assumption of 
general external laws affecting one‟s happiness has turned out unfruitful, as 
the evidence suggests that levels of SWB draw on inner sources rather than 
on outer ones (Veenhoven, 1991; Diener & Lucas, 2000; Schimmack & 
Lucas, 2007). People from all socioeconomic and ethnic groups report their 
satisfaction well above neutral (Diener & Lucas, 2000), and as Peterson and 
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Park (2009) noticed, “most people rate themselves as somewhat above the 
midpoint of a happiness scale, whether they are multimillionaires in the 
United States… or homeless prostitutes in Calcutta…” (p. 304). Hence, the 
four-dimension model‟s focus on internal emotional processes might be seen 
as both its limitation and its strength. (Please see section on Objective 
Indicators and Happiness, page 48, for further information.) 
 
(Please see sections on Extended Discussion, page 93, and Discussion of 
Mediation Analyses‟ Results, page 83, for further information.) 
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Extended Background 
 
The Positive Psychology and Positive Clinical Psychology Movements 
 
The positive psychology movement was conceptualised in the late 1990s, 
as being a science of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits 
and positive institutions (Robbins, 2008). It grew largely out of recognition of an 
imbalance in clinical psychology (which focused on studies of disorder and 
psychological damage) and aspired to encourage research in neglected areas 
of positive human experience (Gable & Haidt, 2005). 
 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000), the pioneers of the positive 
psychology movement, argued that the exclusive focus on pathology has 
dominated psychological discipline and resulted in a negativistic model of 
human beings that lacks the positive features that make life worth living, and a 
distorted view of normal and exceptional human experience. Since World War 
II, psychological science has focused on healing and repairing mental damage 
within a disease model of human functioning. The authors proposed that this 
attention to the subject of pathology has led to a neglect of studying human 
strengths and virtues, fulfilled individuals and thriving communities. 
 
Linley, Joseph, Harrington and Wood (2006) argued that psychology has 
largely neglected the latter two of its pre-World War II tasks: curing mental 
illness, helping all people to lead more productive and fulfilling lives, and 
nurturing high talent. Especially, clinical psychology has become a healing 
discipline based upon a disease model and illness ideology. As Sheldon and 
King (2001) explained, clinical psychologists have traditionally focused the 
majority of their attention on treatment of pathologies, and therefore limited 
attention has been paid to the nature of psychological wellbeing. Therefore, 
positive psychology attempts to redress what is perceived as an imbalance in 
the focus of research attention and practice goals in psychology (Linley et al, 
2006). 
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Positive psychology does not deny the distressing, unpleasant or negative 
aspects of life, and fully acknowledges the existence of human suffering, 
dysfunctional family systems, and ineffective institutions. As argued by Gable 
and Haidt (2005), the aim of positive psychology is to study the other (largely 
neglected) side of the coin in order to recognise and address the full spectrum 
of human experience. The aim is not to erase or replace work on pathology, 
dysfunction and distress. Rather the aim is to build up empirically sound 
knowledge about human strengths, and to integrate and complement the 
existing evidence base. Positive psychology attempts to shift the implicit value 
basis of psychological inquiry from exclusively deficit-focus to also an asset-
focus, and therefore to synthesise positive and negative aspects of human 
experience, so that the psychology discipline as a whole becomes unified and 
integrated (Linley et al., 2006). The aim of positive psychology, as explained by 
Joseph and Linley (2006), is to promote a holistic approach to human 
experience, concerned equally with both positive and negative aspects. 
 
The academic and applied focus of the positive psychology movement may 
be considered on three mutually complementing levels (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Firstly, the subjective level, which is about valued 
subjective experiences, such as contentment, life satisfaction, hope, optimism, 
and flow and happiness. Secondly, the individual or personal level, which is 
concerned with positive individual traits, interpersonal skills, capacity for love 
and vocation, courage, perseverance, forgiveness, future-mindedness, 
spirituality, talent and wisdom. And thirdly, the group or social level, which is 
about the civic virtues and institutions that create possibilities for better 
citizenship, such as responsibility, tolerance, nurturance, altruism, civility, 
moderation, and work ethic. Given these levels, Gable and Haidt (2005) 
proposed to define positive psychology as the study of the conditions and 
processes that contribute to the flourishing and optimal functioning of 
individuals, groups and institutions. 
 
However, Linley et al. (2006) offered a different classification of the levels of 
analysis in positive psychology: wellsprings (e.g. genetic foundations of 
wellbeing and early environmental experiences that support the development of 
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strengths and virtues), processes (that is psychological ingredients that lead to 
the good life), mechanisms (defined as extra-psychological factors that facilitate 
the pursuit of a good life, such as interpersonal, organisational, social and 
political systems, in which human lives are embedded), and outcomes (i.e. 
subjective, social and cultural states that characterise a good life, such as 
happiness, fulfilment, health, positive communities and institutions, and political, 
economic and environmental policies that promote harmony and sustainability). 
Given their categorisation of positive psychology analysis levels, Linley et al. 
(2006) proposed the following definition: 
 
Positive psychology is the scientific study of optimal human functioning. 
At the meta-psychological level, it aims to redress the imbalance in 
psychological research and practice by calling attention to the positive 
aspects of human functioning and experience, and integrating them with 
our understanding of the negative aspects of human functioning and 
experience. At the pragmatic level, it is about understanding the 
wellsprings, processes and mechanisms that lead to desirable 
outcomes. (p. 8) 
 
As argued by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000), the social and 
behavioural sciences can create an empirically sound vision of good life and 
show what actions lead to wellbeing, healthy individuals and thriving 
communities, and how people‟s lives can be most worth living. Positive 
psychology is therefore interested in „an average person‟ and attempts to find 
out what works, what is right, what is improving, and ultimately, what is the 
nature of effectively functioning human being (Sheldon & King, 2001). Positive 
psychology, as Joseph and Linley (2006) proposed, is therefore implicitly 
political because it aspires to provide empirically derived suggestions for how to 
create a healthier, happier, and more fulfilled world for people. Positive 
psychologists postulate that the study of human strengths and virtues should be 
a central topic to a psychology of human condition, rather than one that is left 
out of psychological focus (Linley et al, 2006), and that affirmation of humanistic 
principles with emphasis on happiness and optimal experience is made explicit 
(Robbins, 2008). 
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 47 of 135. 
 
 
Understanding and facilitating happiness is the most central objective for 
positive psychology researchers and practitioners (Carr, 2004). Happiness can 
be generally defined as subjective wellbeing (SWB) (Noddings, 2003). 
Happiness is therefore a positive subjective and individual experience of the 
person who believes that his/her life and current events are going well (Nettle, 
2005; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008). Robbins (2008) pinpointed however that 
positive psychology has shifted from a hedonic vision of positive experiences 
towards an alternative vision grounded in the Aristotelian concept of 
eudemonia. While hedonic happiness is perceived through the ratio of 
pleasures to pains in a person‟s life, the eudemonic wellbeing reflects an 
individual who is flourishing in terms of her/his character strengths and personal 
virtues, including autonomy, mastery of the environment, personal growth, 
positive interpersonal relationships, self-acceptance, and purpose in life. 
 
Linley and Joseph (2004) argued that a growing number of professional 
psychologists who work within settings that are primarily clinical consider 
themselves to be practitioners of positive psychology. The authors defined 
applied positive psychology, as “the application of positive psychology research 
to the facilitation of optimal functioning” (p. 4), and explained that applied 
positive psychologists promote optimal experiences across the full range of 
human functioning, from disorder and distress to health and fulfilment. Positive 
psychology concepts have also received increasing attention in clinical 
psychology. Ruini and Fava (2004) argued that in clinical settings it is 
particularly important to work on an individual and personal development of a 
client, with emphasis on changes in wellbeing occurring during psychotherapy. 
Maddux, Snyder and Lopez (2004) went even further and announced the 
beginning of the positive clinical psychology movement, which rejects the 
medical illness ideology as the most accurate approach for conceiving of the 
psychologically problematic aspects of human life. The authors argued that 
positive clinical psychologists refute the illness model‟s premise that normal 
problems in human lives are symptoms of psychopathologies. “This refutation is 
based on the assumption that the illness perspective is not a scientific theory or 
set of facts but rather a socially constructed ideology” (p. 325). Instead, Maddux 
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et al. (2004) proposed that positive clinical psychologists should adopt an 
alternative, dimensional model, which assumes that normality and abnormality, 
wellness and illness, and effective and ineffective psychological functioning lie 
along a continuum, and so-called psychological disorders are simply extreme 
variants of normal psychological phenomena and ordinary problems in life. 
Therefore, as argued by Joseph and Linley (2006), the main role of positive 
clinical psychologists is to identify individual strengths of their clients and 
promote their mental health as assets which buffer against emotional and 
psychological difficulties. 
 
Objective Indicators and Happiness 
 
As argued by Carr (2004), worldwide studies of SWB have demonstrated 
that the majority of people are moderately happy, and the positive reports of 
happiness characterise both genders, all age groups, and all races studied. 
There has been a debate in the field of positive psychology about the 
importance of objective quality of life indicators and their influence on individual 
happiness. As initially argued within the discussion paragraph of the main 
journal paper, there has been however a growing consensus that SWB draws 
mainly on internal individual sources and that many commonsensical 
presumptions about the importance of external factors have not been supported 
with any statistically significant findings (Veenhoven, 1991; Diener & Lucas, 
2000; Schimmack & Lucas, 2007). Also, as stated by Argyle (2001), a number 
of studies suggesting that happiness is not something that can be achieved 
through „hard work‟ or „good luck‟ has been increasing. The initial justification for 
not considering objective indicators of quality of life within the study model has 
been provided the journal paper discussion paragraphs. Further data to support 
the argument will now be discussed. 
 
Income. As Western societies got richer during the last five decades, their 
people have not become any happier, yet at the same time average income has 
more than doubled (Layard, 2005). In the Great Britain, despite the massive 
increase in real income at every point of the income distribution, there has been 
no raise in the number of „very happy‟ people, nor any decrease in those who 
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are „not very happy‟ since 1950s. According to income position in British 
society, 54% of the top quarter and 59% of the bottom quarter respondents 
perceive themselves as „quite happy‟ (Layard, 2005). In a developed nation, 
economic progress buys only an insignificant amount of extra happiness 
(Oswald, 1997). Moreover, a comparison of SWB amongst the Western 
industrialised countries suggests that the rich ones are not happier than the 
poorer.  In fact, some existing evidence suggests that poor people can be even 
happier than rich ones (Schwarz & Strack, 1991). 
 
Occupational success. Skinner (1974) suggested that the brief state of 
elation an individual feels upon completing a difficult task seems to be 
associated with positive reinforcement, which is pleasing and joyful. Haidt 
(2006) reviewed the existing empirical studies and concluded that there was no 
evidence suggesting that personal or occupational success increases overall 
happiness. An underjoyed response to success appears normal. The „pre-goal 
attainment positive affect‟ appears even more stable than the „post-goal 
attainment positive affect‟, which is usually a short-lived feeling of contentment 
and reduces rapidly after a goal has been achieved (Haidt, 2006).  
 
Marital and employment status. In the face of research outcomes, many 
intuitive theories turned out to be wrong. For example, not all individuals are 
unhappy when divorced or unemployed – indeed, some are happier (Argyle, 
2001). A number of studies reported that a vast majority (up to 96%) of 
unmarried, unemployed and relatively uneducated people reported being 
satisfied with their lives (Diener & Diener, 1996). Almost zero association was 
found between having children and happiness (Powdthavee, 2009). 
 
Physical and psychological difficulties. Studies reported by Schwarz and 
Strack (1991) provided some evidence that hospitalised patients can be even 
happier than a healthy control group. A review of studies conducted by Diener 
and Diener (1996) suggested that the majority of physically and psychologically 
disadvantaged individuals report positive SWB. For instance, 68% of a stratified 
sample of physically disabled adults reported being somewhat to very satisfied. 
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Human beings seem to possess an ability to regain high levels of SWB 
even in the face of the most aversive life events, such as major illness, loss or 
disability (Filipp & Klauer, 1991). The dynamic equilibrium theory of SWB 
(Headey, 2006) – which is an observational, not an explanatory theory – 
suggests that individuals generally oscillate around their own set point of SWB, 
and people usually return to a baseline level of their happiness following major 
life events, both negative and positive. 
 
Psychosis Paradigms 
 
McCulloch (2006) identified four major models of understanding the 
aetiology of psychological difficulties. These were: medical – concerned with the 
biological and chemical basis of an illness (perceived as a mental illness), 
psychosocial – concerned with life events, family dynamics, and belief systems, 
intuitive/spiritual – perceiving the mind as a battleground for conflicting forces, 
such as consciousness vs. unconsciousness, good vs. evil, and existential – 
viewing mental illness as another form of human existence.  
 
The key paradigms of psychosis emerged mainly from the medical and 
psychosocial models. The earliest psychiatric paradigm was outlined by 
Kraepelin and his perspective dominated research between the end of the 
nineteenth century and the mid-1970s (Morrison, Renton, Dunn, Williams & 
Bentall, 2004). The key assumption was that psychosis was caused by brain 
abnormalities that were probably inherited and could be best described via 
diagnostic concepts such as schizophrenia. The second paradigm, which was a 
hybrid between medical and psychosocial explanations, is exemplified by 
stress-vulnerability models of psychosis (Morrison et al., 2004). This paradigm 
assumes that biologically vulnerable individuals become psychotic only when 
exposed to stressful and traumatic life events. 
 
Bentall (2006) argued that many researchers studying psychosis believe 
that there is a current paradigm shift in understanding the aetiology of 
experiences of psychosis. The psychosocial paradigm of psychosis has its 
origins in late 1980s and has focused on specific symptoms (particular 
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experiences and complaints) rather than broad diagnostic categories. It 
attempts to explain the symptoms of psychosis through underlying 
psychological processes and individual beliefs arising from significant 
experiences and interpersonal relationships (Morrison et al., 2004). The 
psychosocial paradigm focuses on the causal role that some of the 
environmental factors might have on the aetiology of psychosis (Bentall, 2006). 
These environmental factors are: family relationships (mainly insecure 
attachment relationships with parents), traumatic experiences (especially 
childhood sexual abuse), and discrimination and victimisation (such as racial 
discrimination and social marginalisation). As argued by Dudley, Siitarinen, 
James and Dodgson (2009), these causal factors mirror the predominant self-
explanations expressed by people with psychosis, which are centred around the 
themes of traumatic experiences and personal sensitivity. Within the 
psychosocial paradigm, people with episodes of psychosis are assumed to 
have experienced serious, abusive and emotionally overwhelming incidents or 
relationships. Hence, Romme and Escher (2004) suggested that symptoms of 
psychosis should not be perceived as suggesting the presence of medically 
identifiable psychopathology, but rather as an extreme psychological reaction to 
adverse, traumatic and stressful experiences. The psychosocial paradigm also 
assumes that the same underlying psychological processes (e.g. formation of 
unhelpful, dysfunctional beliefs) occur in psychosis as they do in other 
psychological difficulties, such as in anxiety or depression (Good, 2002).  
 
Emotional Distress in Psychosis 
 
Frith and Johnstone (2003) reviewed a history of the models of psychosis 
and concluded that since the earliest developments of diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia, a decrease in emotional functioning has been included in its 
overall picture. The Kraepelinian concept of dementia praecox incorporated 
symptoms of anhedonia, whereas abnormal affect and weakness of volitional 
processes in schizophrenia were highlighted by Bleuler. Furthermore, lack of 
self-direction was also described by Schneider in his classification of first-rank 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Frith & Johnstone, 2003). 
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As argued by Strauss (1994), individual self-regulatory abilities are 
considerably decreased in psychosis. Frith (1997) described the importance of 
negative effect that experiences of psychosis have on a person‟s awareness of 
goals and intentions, which might affect an individual‟s emotional functioning 
even further. The author concluded that possibly the most subjectively terrifying 
result of psychotic experience would be the sense of personal autonomy being 
violated, and belief that control over oneself has been lost. Andreasen (1994) 
argued that subjective experiences of psychosis effect the entire scope of the 
individual‟s cognitions, emotions, and behaviour. Hence, it is unsurprising that a 
high prevalence of depressive symptomatology has been identified amongst 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia (Siris, 1991). 
 
Fowler, Garety and Kuipers (1995) reviewed a number of studies which 
have demonstrated that severe symptoms of depression and anxiety were 
found prevalent amongst people with chronic psychosis. The authors argued 
that people diagnosed with schizophrenia were found to frequently report 
severe anxiety, feelings of despair, loneliness, and unworthiness as being at 
least of equal, if not higher, importance than the symptoms traditionally defining 
psychosis itself. Outcomes of the study conducted by Martin and Penn (2001) 
confirmed that higher levels of paranoid ideation were significantly associated 
with greater depressed mood, social anxiety and avoidance, evaluation 
apprehension, and lower self-esteem. Although, depressive symptoms have 
long been known to accompany symptoms of psychosis, there has been 
growing appreciation that affective disturbance has its distinct course within the 
psychotic symptomatology (Scheller-Gilkey, Thomas, Woolwine & Miller, 2002). 
For instance, Bentall (2003) developed a model of paranoid thinking leading to 
dysphoria. The psychological processes incorporated into the model were the 
same as those involved in abnormal mood, which suggested a close 
relationship between depression and psychosis. Another view on affective 
symptomatology in psychosis was presented by Maier, Cornblatt and 
Merikangas (2003) who described depressive disorder as an integral part of 
premorbid and prodromal symptoms of an emerging psychotic illness. 
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Cognitive Model of Psychosis 
 
Generally, current views about emotional distress in psychosis fall into two 
perspectives: in the first, some types of psychosis related symptoms may 
partially result from emotional disturbance; and in the second, depression and 
anxiety may arise as a consequence of appraising the experiences of psychosis 
(Fowler et al., 1995). The former perspective suggests that in extreme instances 
of depression, experiences of psychosis (such as persecutory delusions) may 
emerge to defend an individual against the threats to one‟s self-image (Bentall, 
Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). 
The second perspective has been rooted in cognitive theory of 
psychological difficulties. Within this perspective, Fowler et al. (1995) suggested 
that depression should be perceived as an understandable response to the 
adverse experiences and social circumstances associated with psychosis. An 
individual with experiences of psychosis may become entrapped into vicious 
cognitive circles leading to extremely negative conclusions about him/herself, 
his/her future and the surrounding world. This reaction is associated with 
feelings of helplessness, despair and hopelessness deriving from negative 
cognitive appraisal (Fowler et al., 1995). Also, feelings of shame and guilt 
resulting from having hallucinatory experiences were described by Reeves 
(2000) as common amongst individuals with psychosis. Moreover, Tarrier 
(2002) proposed that the depressive/anxious responses might reinforce the 
psychotic experiences further by contributing through increased activity levels 
within the arousal system. 
 
Most delusional and hallucinatory experiences appear to have a personal 
meaning that can often be highly threatening, and therefore could exaggerate 
the emotional distress of an individual (Fowler et al., 1995). Romme and Escher 
(1993) reported that people who believed they could not cope with their 
hallucinations felt considerably weaker and were less able to communicate 
about the voices. Vaughan and Fowler (2004) reported evidence which 
suggested that higher levels of psychological distress correlated with 
experiencing positive symptoms of psychosis, especially auditory hallucinations, 
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as dominating, insulting and commanding. Diez-Alegria, Vazquez, Nieto-
Moreno, Valiente and Fuentenebro (2006) found that personal attribution did, 
indeed, magnify the severity of psychosis related experiences. Another study 
conducted by Green et al. (2006) suggested that specific personal appraisal of 
delusions or hallucinations affected the severity of depression amongst 
participants with psychosis; depression was higher in those who felt less 
powerful than their „persecutors‟. 
 
As suggested by Rhodes and Jakes (2000), most delusions relate to 
fundamental concerns in individuals‟ lives and to personal aims. Moreover, 
Lysaker and Lysaker (2001) highlighted that the emotional dysregulation in 
psychosis might profoundly interfere with maintenance of personal identity. 
Therefore, emotional distress amongst people diagnosed with schizophrenia 
can be understood in terms of the nature of their relationship with their 
delusional or hallucinatory experiences: if an individual‟s autonomy is perceived 
to be threatened then the person reacts with emotional distress such as anxiety 
or depression (Birchwood, Meaden, Trower & Gilbert, 2002). Similarly, Coleman 
and Smith (2005) argued that hallucinations in themselves may not necessary 
be the problem; rather the individual relationship with them accounts for the 
levels of individual psychological distress. Krabbendam et al. (2005) provided 
some evidence suggesting that the relation between hallucinations and 
depression is mediated by personal beliefs about the voices. Chin, Hayward 
and Drinnan (2009) investigated the relationships that people experiencing 
psychosis had with their voices. The authors concluded that exploration of these 
relationships might have an effect on emphasizing voice hearer‟s strengths and 
ameliorating their distress. 
 
Chadwick, Birchwood and Trower (1996) proposed that particular beliefs 
about voices predict a person‟s distress and coping behaviour much better than 
voice content: beliefs about threat are related to anxiety and avoidance/escape 
behaviour, whereas beliefs about loss are related to depression and withdrawal. 
Interestingly, Bentall, Kinderman and Moutoussis (2008) noted that, from a 
cognitive perspective, people with psychosis who hold paranoid beliefs, like 
depressed people, make excessively stable and global attributions and have a 
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pessimistic attributional style. However, in contrast to depressed people, they 
make excessively external attributions for negative events. Furthermore, a study 
conducted by Fornells-Ambrojo and Garety (2009) suggested that if the „poor 
me‟ belief dominates in paranoia, it typically generates high levels of anger, 
depression, and anxiety. 
 
As pinpointed by Chadwick (2008), mental health professionals need to 
acknowledge that psychosis has both personal meaning and narrative sense for 
an individual. Understanding the experiences of psychosis in the context of a 
person‟s whole life is a very constructive process, and gaining insight into the 
meaning of an individual‟s own crisis plays a pivotal role in recovery. Allen et al. 
(2005) conducted a study which examined the associations between 
hallucinatory predispositions, emotional status and reasoning. The outcome 
confirmed that both emotions and cognitions need to be carefully considered in 
order to understand hallucinatory experiences better. 
 
The cognitive model of psychosis has been supported with empirical 
research and resulted in development of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for 
psychosis [CBTp] (Fowler et al., 1995; Twamley, Jeste & Bellack, 2003; 
Morrison, Renton, French & Bentall, 2008). Results of empirical studies on 
CBTp effectiveness appear encouraging (Roth & Fonagy, 2005; 
Christodoulides, Dudley, Brown, Turkington & Beck, 2008). CBTp has also been 
supported with positive results of randomised control trials (Startup, Jackson & 
Pearce, 2002), and case studies (Kirkland, 2005), and has been recommended 
by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence within the clinical guidelines for 
schizophrenia (Berry & Haddock, 2008). Furthermore, a randomised Australian 
study conducted by Farhall, Freeman, Shawyer and Trauer (2009) 
demonstrated high satisfaction and acceptability ratings amongst the clients 
with psychosis and comorbid affective difficulties who received CBTp. 
Additionally, the mean client-rated working alliance within CBTp appeared 
excellent. As highlighted by Steel (2008), the development of CBTp has 
challenged a traditional medical paradigm of psychosis through direct 
engagement with the content of psychosis related experiences and highlighted 
the extent to which the aetiology and maintenance of psychosis can be 
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understood through psychological processes associated with depression and 
anxiety. 
 
Diagnostic Descriptions of Psychosis – Critical Remarks 
 
Medically oriented descriptions of psychosis continue to dominate within 
mental health services. Even the latest edition of the Oxford Dictionary of 
Psychology defines psychosis using medical terminology as: “any mental 
disorder characterised by delusions and/or prominent hallucinations with or… 
without insight into their pathological nature” (Colman, 2009, p. 622) [underlined 
by the researcher]. 
 
Approaches to the diagnosis of schizophrenia have changed. Traditionally, 
diagnosis has depended on the presence of behavioural phenomena that could 
be recognised by observation or client‟s report (Conklin & Iacono, 2003), and 
negative symptoms have been regarded as a fundamental component of 
schizophrenia (Andreasen & Flaum, 1991). Boyle (2002) noticed that since the 
introduction of psychiatric diagnostic systems, a radical change in diagnosing 
schizophrenia took place and the emphasis moved from negative to positive 
symptoms. However, recent developments of diagnostic guidelines appear to 
be placing more prominence on the negative symptoms again. For instance, 
ICD-10 described the presence of a consistent decrease in the overall quality of 
the person‟s functioning that could be manifested as loss of interest, 
aimlessness, idleness, a self-absorbed attitude, and social withdrawal (World 
Health Organisation, 1992). 
 
The psychosocial paradigm of psychosis has produced an evidence base 
exposing the naivety of medical explanations of the aetiology of psychosis, and 
revealed a number of shortcomings of psychiatric diagnoses (Leudar & 
Thomas, 2000; Whitwell, 2005). Read (2004 a, 2004 b) reviewed a number of 
studies which demonstrated that the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia do not 
meet scientific requirements for establishing that the concept objectively exist 
(reliability), or for being useful in terms of understanding anything (validity), and 
that the illness theory of schizophrenia fails to establish its biological cause 
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(aetiology) and predict efficacy of medical treatments (outcome). Johnstone 
(2006) agreed that diagnostic systems lack any scientific basis and are 
characterised by low reliability, lack of validity, overlap between categories, and 
by unclear aetiology, prognosis and treatment. Amongst other criticisms of 
diagnostic guidelines is their atheoretical and descriptive nature (Dudley & 
Kuyken, 2006). As noticed by Boyle (2007), empirical studies have not justified 
any independent ways of deciding which experiences belong to which 
diagnostic clusters. 
 
Maddux et al. (2004) argued that diagnoses are socially constructed 
artefacts; their meanings have been negotiated rather than discovered or 
revealed. They therefore hold no rigorous scientific justification. Furthermore, 
given that over recent years these socially constructed concepts have 
expanded with each revision of diagnostic guidelines, more relatively ordinary 
human behaviours have become pathologised, and consequently the number of 
people with diagnosable „mental disorders‟ has grown. The authors argued that 
should this tendency remain, “eventually everything that human beings think, 
feel, do, and desire that is not perfectly logical, adaptive, or efficient will become 
a mental disorder” (p. 327). 
 
Linley and Joseph (2004) agreed that an extensive use of diagnostic 
categories and labels amongst clinicians has contributed to an increasing 
psychiatric medicalisation and pathologisation of everyday life experiences. 
Furthermore, as argued by Maddux et al. (2004), because of the long 
established reliance on psychiatric concepts, clinical psychology has also 
become pathologised and the assumptions of an illness ideology continue as 
implicit guides to clinical psychologists‟ activities, that is, the psychological 
treatment alleviates disordered conditions that reside within the person and are 
thought of as symptoms. The authors stated further that the illness metaphor 
prescribes a medicalised way of thinking about psychological distress, and 
implies that psychological problems are like biological diseases. 
Psychopathologies are automatically labelled as disorders, rather than extreme 
variants of common problems in life and expected human difficulties and 
imperfections. Furthermore, Geekie (2004), and Read and Haslam (2004) 
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reviewed research demonstrating that bio-genetic explanations of psychosis 
increase fear and prejudice towards the individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, and lead to their social marginalisation. 
 
Romme and Escher (2004) warned that the medical model of psychosis 
may be dangerous, since it subsumes the link between personal history and the 
emergence of symptoms of schizophrenia, and therefore diverts intervention 
onto pharmacological therapy, hinders psychological support, and increases the 
chances of the symptoms‟ recurrence. Medical models of psychological 
difficulties hold that the causes of emotional and behavioural problems are 
located inside the individual, and are analogous to symptoms of medical 
illnesses (Joseph & Linley, 2006). Campbell (2007) argued that many patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia felt trapped within the negative medically oriented 
professional framework, which in their opinion encouraged the dismissal of 
significant aspects of their experience, and seemed stigmatising and 
discriminatory. Descriptive and schematic psychiatric outline of „schizophrenic‟ 
difficulties and minimisation of psychological understanding of individual 
experiences, such as in Levi (1998), does indeed seem emotionless and 
entrapping. 
 
Read, Mosher and Bental (2004) noticed, however, that there has been an 
increasing recognition amongst the clinical psychology practitioners and 
researchers that the notion of „schizophrenic disease‟ is not supported by sound 
scientific research and is extremely damaging to those with such a stigmatising 
psychiatric label. The authors argued further that the psychiatric model of 
schizophrenia has been responsible for unhelpful and unjustifiable pessimism 
about the recovery chances and ignored psychological investigation of what is 
actually happening in the lives of those experiencing psychosis. Moreover, 
reductionistic biological theories of schizophrenia have led to lobotomizing, 
electroshocking and drugging of those labelled as schizophrenic, despite the 
paucity of scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of such practices 
(Read, 2004 c, Ross & Read, 2004). 
 
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 59 of 135. 
 
To summarise the diagnostic concepts of mental illnesses, Bentall (2004) 
used the metaphor of astrology: 
 
Like star signs, psychiatric diagnoses are widely believed to tell us 
something about ourselves, to explain our behaviour and personality, 
and to predict what will happen to us in the future. Like star signs, 
diagnoses fail on all of these counts, and peddle meaningless 
generalisations... or extravagant but unsubstantiated claims... as if they 
are scientific truths. (p. 195) 
 
Extended Rationale for the Study 
 
As argued by Bentall (2004), “emotions play a pivotal role in human 
nature… Yet, curiously, they are not usually considered to be important features 
of some of the extreme forms of mental suffering…” (p. 205). Strauss (1989) 
raised the issue of mental health professionals often ignoring or avoiding many 
aspects of patients‟ reports about their experiences of psychosis. He argued 
that “we in mental health field do not listen to what patients experience as well 
as we think. There are many things that patients are trying to tell us about their 
subjective experiences that we systematically fail to hear…” (p. 179). The 
author suggested that this implicitly dismissive attitude was the outcome of a 
limited range of experiential phenomena operationalized by descriptive 
psychiatry. Therefore, he urged mental health professionals to look into 
subjective experiences of psychotic patients more openly and to use a growing 
variety of subjective assessment scales more readily. 
 
Social disadvantage of individuals with psychosis has been another issue 
described in mental health literature. For instance, Lingwood (2006) argued that 
people with severe psychological problems have historically been located at the 
edges of community life and have been amongst the most excluded of all social 
groups. Furthermore, Thornicroft (2006) noticed that many people with mental 
health issues suffer enormous disadvantage and discrimination in most aspects 
of their lives, which negatively affects their mood and emotional functioning. 
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Strauss (1989) proposed that understanding, studying and treating severe 
psychopathology requires a focus on the subjective functioning of a „sufferer‟, 
which would involve the person‟s feelings, interpretations, goals, actions and 
interpersonal functioning. Harper (2001) acknowledged that the growing 
importance of psychosocial concepts of psychosis challenged clinicians to offer 
service users a choice of individually fitted explanations and interventions, so 
they could make sense of their experiences in the context of their lives.  
 
Since empirical evidence suggested lack of concordance between 
subjective improvement and observed change in psychosis related 
symptomatology (Cramer et al., 2001; Kupper & Tschacher, 2008), and the 
strong influence of patients‟ mood and emotional functioning on their subjective 
symptoms‟ appraisal (Fakhoury, Kaiser, Roeder-Wanner & Priebe, 2002), the 
necessity to focus on individual experiences and subjective quality of life of 
people with psychosis has become even more important. The significance of 
acknowledging the subjective experiences of people with psychosis and 
enhancing their SWB has been mentioned on a number of occasions (Hayward, 
Blank & Cooke, 2005; Campbell, 2007; May, 2007) and a brief example of 
possible implementation of SWB concepts into understanding and increasing 
SWB and life quality of a person with psychosis was described over a decade 
ago by Csikszentmihalyi (1997). Nevertheless, the authors of the present study 
were unable to find any relevant literature reporting empirical studies that would 
test some propositions of SWB concepts amongst individuals with experiences 
of psychosis. In our opinion, this underrepresentation of positive psychology 
studies amongst individuals with severe mental health difficulties may contribute 
to the implicit ignorance of their capability to experience happiness, and 
consequently to the maintenance of a discriminatory and disadvantaging stance 
towards those diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
This surprising finding has led the authors of the present research to 
appreciate the need for the gap in the knowledge to be filled, and the study 
constitutes an effort to test the suppositions of one of the SWB concepts 
amongst individuals with experiences of psychosis. We hope to demonstrate 
that people who experience psychosis are fully capable of being happy and 
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satisfied with their lives. Moreover, based on suppositions of the four-dimension 
model of SWB and psychological distress, we hope to show that the 
mechanisms governing happiness and satisfaction with life amongst those 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia are similar to individuals from the 
general population. Therefore, the present study attempts to pursue a positive 
clinical psychology approach to research in psychosis, through which we 
endeavour to challenge the establishment of a medically oriented stance to 
understanding severe mental health difficulties. 
 
Extended Methodology 
 
Choice of Research Design and Study Model 
 
As argued by Langdridge (2004), the choice of specific study design ought 
to be informed by the research question or hypotheses, by the investigator‟s 
belief about research and by the researcher‟s ability to use different methods. A 
non-experimental correlational design with the use of standardised 
questionnaires was selected for two main reasons. Firstly, it stays in line with 
the researcher‟s positivistic understanding of science, in which hypothetico-
deductive method is applied in order to empirically test specific hypotheses 
generated by existing theories, concepts and models. And secondly, a 
correlational design appeared appropriate to investigate the research 
hypotheses. As explained by Leary (2004), correlational research can be used 
to investigate the relationships between a number of naturally occurring 
variables. Given that the correlational design can be also used to examine how 
well a specific outcome may be predicted by one or more pieces of information 
(Salkind, 2000), an additional meditation analyses of the gathered data are also 
reported in the extended paper. 
 
Furthermore, given the study model depicted in Figure 2 (page 22), it might 
be argued that the proposed model offers a simplified view of the complex 
psychological processes. However, since the model is explicitly based on the 
empirical studies conducted previously within the areas of (a.) SWB, and (b.) 
psychological distress in psychosis, it does indeed meet the criterion of 
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usefulness in explaining the investigated phenomena (Estes, 1993). The model 
also meets the „good-enough principle‟ as it can be carefully reproduced by 
another researcher and the findings may be scrutinized and disconfirmed in the 
future (Serlin & Lapsley, 1993). 
 
The researcher’s philosophy of science – a brief note. The quantitative, 
correlational study design corresponded with the researcher‟s philosophy of 
science. The author of the present study has taken a positivistic standpoint to 
understanding of science. The researcher agrees with a central principle of 
positivism, which argues that the only phenomena that can be studied 
scientifically are those that can be submitted to direct observation and 
quantitative measurement (Coolican, 2004). Within the positivistic context, a 
hypothetico-deductive method was utilised in the present research in order to 
empirically test specific hypotheses which had been generated by existing 
theories, concepts and models, and by previous empirical evidence. 
 
Sampling Method and Sample Size for Initial and Extended Statistical 
Analyses 
 
Non-probability convenience sampling was adopted for the purpose of this 
study. Based on previous research conducted with the particular client group in 
the catchment area (N. McGrath & C. Turner, personal communication, 
January, 2009), the researcher predicted that a large number of potential 
participants would decline their involvement with the study. Hence, the study 
had to be conducted with those accessible and agreeing to participate. As 
argued by Leary (2004), non-probability samples are perfectly acceptable for 
psychological research, since the goal is typically not to describe how the 
population behaves but rather test the specific hypotheses regarding relations 
between variables in the particular sample. “Of course, we may wonder whether 
the results generalize to other kinds of samples, but this question does not 
undermine the quality of particular study” (Leary, 2004, p.126). 
 
No particular minimum sample size guidelines have been recommended for 
conducting bivariate correlational statistical analyses, such as calculating 
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Pearson‟s r coefficients between variables. However, bearing in mind that the 
effect size and statistical power of conducted tests are both intrinsically linked to 
the sample size (Field, 2009), the researchers aimed to recruiting the maximum 
possible amount of participants within the catchment area. 
  
Furthermore, mediation analysis was chosen for the purpose of additional 
statistical analysis of the gathered data. Again, the sample size 
recommendations for mediation analysis were found to be unclear. For 
instance, Frazier, Tix and Barron (2004) mentioned that the sample size in 
mediation analysis should be adequate to maximize the chances of detecting 
significant interaction effects. However, since multiple regression is an integral 
part of establishing mediating effects, Frazier et al. (2004) also suggested that 
the sample size might be calculated accordingly to the multiple regression 
requirements. Therefore, rules for minimum acceptable sample size in multiple 
regression were followed while deciding about the participant numbers needed 
for conducting a meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
Field (2009) recommended at least 10 cases of data per predictor variable, 
while another rule described by Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky (2006) suggested 
that the smallest number of respondents required should be 40+k (where „k‟ 
was the number of predictors). Furthermore, simulation studies reported by 
Babyak (2004) have shown that the „rules of thumb‟ described above were more 
than satisfactory. The results suggested that when there were fewer than 10 
data cases per predictor, the estimates tended to be biased. However, “for 
linear models, such as multiple regression, a minimum of 10 to 15 observations 
per predictor variable will generally allow good estimates” (Babyak, 2004, 
p.415). 
 
A predictor in multiple regression is a variable that is used in combination 
with others to predict values of a criterion (or outcome) variable (Hammond, 
2000). Given that only two predictors will be entered into each multiple 
regression model while conducting a series of three separate mediation 
analyses, the minimum sample size in the present study had been established 
as 20 to 30 participants. 
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Choice of Measures 
 
Alternatives to the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI). An alternative 
measure considered for the estimation of positive psychotic symptoms, 
depression and anxiety was The Positive and Negative Syndrom Scale 
(PANSS). The PANSS has a wide clinical use and strong psychometric 
properties (Shankar & Nate, 2007). It is, however, recommended that an 
interviewer undergoes thorough training prior to its use, and its administration 
takes at least 30-40 minutes (Kay, Opler, Fiszbein, & Ramirez, 2000). In fact, 
based on clinicians‟ experiences with the use of PANSS, the administration of 
the measure with clients with psychosis may take up to a few hours, which may 
evoke high levels of distress among the interviewees and, consequently, high 
attrition (N. McGrath & C. Turner, personal communication, January, 2009). In 
comparison, the BSI requires only 8-10 minutes to complete. It is therefore 
more useful and appropriate in settings where clients may not tolerate the 
assessment well and when assessment time is limited (Derogatis, 1993). 
 
Other alternative measures considered were the Beck Depression Inventory 
– 2nd Edition (Arnau, Meagher, Norris & Bramson, 2001) and the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (Leyfer, Ruberg & Woodruff-Borden, 2006). However, the BSI does 
contain the depression and anxiety dimensions amongst the other scales, and 
both were described as having strong psychometric properties (Derogatis, 
1993). For example, Ruz et al. (2010) reported the following properties of the 
BSI Anxiety Scale: Cronbach alpha internal consistency coefficient was 
established as 0.62 (significant at 0.01 level), item-total correlations ranged 
from 0.67 to 0.83, criterion-related validity examined through correlation with 
State Anxiety Inventory was 0.69 (Spearman coefficient), and construct validity 
was also reported to be high. 
 
To ensure the participants‟ comfort and willingness to take part in the study, 
the researcher aimed to limit the assessment time to minimum. Therefore the 
BSI had been chosen over the mentioned alternative measures. 
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Alternative to the Affect Balance Scale (ABS). The Positive Affectivity 
and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) was considered as an alternative to 
the ABS. It consists of 20 items describing different feelings, which are rated by 
respondents on the „not at all‟ to „extremely‟ scale (Carr, 2004). However, as 
identified by Pressman and Cohen (2005), the PANAS includes adjectives that 
are not typical mood items (e.g. „strong‟, „determined‟, or „active‟), and excludes 
low-activated moods such as „calm‟, „content‟, and „relaxed‟ as well as many 
common positive affect adjectives such as „cheerful‟ and „joyful‟. In the 
researcher‟s opinion, this limited the tool‟s usefulness in measurement of 
constructs related to emotional aspects of happiness. The ABS, on the other 
hand, is well regarded by authorities in positive psychology (Argyle, 2001), and 
has demonstrated usefulness in clinical and medical research (e.g. Kushner et 
al., 2008). 
 
Alternative to the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS). The Oxford 
Happiness Questionnaire (OHQ) was considered by the researcher as an 
alternative option for the assessment of life satisfaction. However, Kashdan 
(2004) argued that in comparison with the other well-established happiness 
measures, the 29-item OHQ is longer, is overly redundant with the constructs of 
self-esteem, sense of purpose and social interest, and has no theoretical 
rationale for diffuse content being assessed. The author recommended the 
SWLS to be a much more accurate measure of life satisfaction and described it 
as “less time-intensive, theory-driven, with good psychometric properties” 
(p.1231). 
 
Measurement of Happiness 
 
A measurement of SWB may pose some concern to researchers and 
clinicians (Basu, 2004), especially when applied to those with severe mental 
health difficulties (Cramer et al., 2001). Some authors have even questioned the 
validity of subjective aspects of quality of life assessments with individuals with 
complex mental health issues due to credibility of patients‟ self report being 
negatively affected by their psychological difficulties (Basu, 2004) and due to 
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the possibility of having diminished insight into their illness (Vaz, Bejar & 
Casado, 2002).  
 
However, Noddings (2003) argued that the judgement of happiness can be 
best and only made by the person who claims or disavows happiness 
him/herself. Subjective appraisal may differ considerably from the observational 
one made by the external assessor; thus, it can never be credibly judged that a 
person is happy, if the person says that s/he is not (Noddings, 2003). 
Happiness appears to be located mainly in the mind; it depends on how we 
perceive things, how we appraise events in relation to our individual values and 
expectations. Therefore, in studying happiness, researchers should be 
concerned primarily with measurement of subjective side of wellbeing, rather 
than objective measures of social indicators (Argyle, 2001). 
 
Study Procedure 
 
Messari and Hallam (2003) reported that the main reason for refusal to 
participate in research study among the clients with psychosis was that “they 
did not wish to meet anyone else but the therapist” (p.173). Hence, the 
recruitment and assessment in the current study were conducted entirely by the 
clinical psychologists among their clients with whom they already had an 
established therapeutic relationship and working alliance. 
 
Clinical psychologists determined whether a particular client within their 
caseloads met the inclusion criteria for the research. In order to make this 
decision they inspected their clients‟ case notes and searched for the ICD-10 
F20.0 diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia (WHO, 1992), which was the only 
information obtained from the participants‟ medical records. The clients were 
first informally asked to take part in the study by their psychologists during one 
of their sessions. If they expressed initial interest, they were given information 
sheets which provided a clear, accessible and detailed explanation of the 
research goals and procedures (see Appendix A). They were then allowed at 
least a week to make up their minds, ask additional questions and to request 
further information about the study. Those who agreed to take part were then 
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asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix B) and complete the 
questionnaires at the subsequent session. The measures were administered 
with the participants by their clinical psychologists in a fixed order: the BSI, the 
ABS and the SWLS. Completion of the full assessment set took approximately 
15-20 minutes. Most of the clients preferred to complete the measures by 
themselves. Only a few asked their psychologists to read the items aloud. After 
the questionnaires had been completed, they were immediately sealed in an 
envelope together with demographic data, however separately to the consent 
form. Following the assessment, should participants wish to, they were afforded 
the opportunity to debrief their Psychologist about their experiences of 
participating in the study, and ask any additional questions. Additionally, the 
participants‟ care co-ordinators, if applicable, were informed about the research 
in writing (see Appendix D). The sealed envelopes were then posted to the 
Chief Investigator‟s university base and stored securely in locked cabinets. 
Consent forms were stored separately to the data obtained from the 
questionnaires. The research team had no access to the identifiable personal 
data on the consent forms. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
The British Psychological Society (BPS) Code of Conduct, Ethical Principles 
and Guidelines (2005) were followed by the research team throughout the 
study. The following principles were addressed: informed consent, lack of 
deception and coercion, debriefing, right to withdraw from the investigation, 
confidentiality, protection of participants, and sharing results. 
 
Cozby (2009) explained that to allow potential participants to give informed 
consent, they should be provided with all information that might influence their 
decision of whether to participate. In the current study all clients identified as 
potential participants were given out information sheets describing the study in 
a detailed, accessible and comprehensive manner. They were given the 
opportunity to make up their minds for at least a week. They were all 
encouraged to ask their Psychologists questions and consult other persons and 
professionals who were not involved in the study (e.g. nurse, social worker, 
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general practitioner, friend, etc.). Contact telephone numbers to chief and 
principle investigators were also provided, should they have wished to discuss 
any matter related to the research. 
 
The participants were not deceived in any way prior, during or after the 
study. Barrett (2000) clarified that deception in research, understood as 
withholding of information or misleading of participants, is unacceptable if the 
participants are likely to object or experience apprehension once debriefed. The 
study‟s goals and procedures were made explicit to the participants before they 
consented to the research, and the measures used were thoroughly described. 
 
As explained by Leary (2004), coercion to participate occurs when 
participants agree to take part in the study because of real or implied pressure 
from an individual who has some authority or influence over them. All 
participants were recruited by their Psychologists with whom they had already 
established a therapeutic relationship, which might be perceived as a potential 
limitation of the study and might pose an ethical concern. As described by 
Evans-Jones, Peters and Barker (2009), clients with psychosis, due to the 
nature of their clinical presentation and their past interpersonal experiences, 
may often find it difficult to establish a sound therapeutic relationship with a 
therapist and may distrust or hold delusional beliefs about their therapists‟ 
intentions. This might have potentially distorted the participants‟ perception of 
their Psychologists‟ underlying intentions when they were asked to take part in 
the research study. Bearing in mind the potential misinterpretation of the 
Psychologists‟ intentions, which would lead to an amplification of the power 
imbalance within the therapeutic relationship, the BPS (2005) guidelines and 
recommendations made by Leary (2004) were followed in order to prevent 
these from occurring. To be exact, all participants were carefully explained in a 
simple and accessible language that they did not have to participate, and 
should they decline, this would not have any negative effect on therapeutic 
relationship or on psychological intervention they were receiving. It was also 
made clear to the participants at the outset of the study (both by their 
Psychologists and within Participant Information Sheets) that they had a right to 
withdraw from the research at any time, without giving any particular reasons. 
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All participants were also encouraged to raise any worries or concerns they had 
about their participation in the study outside of the therapeutic relationship. 
They were advised to discuss their participation with other professionals 
involved in their care or with family members prior to making their decisions 
about taking part in the study. 
 
As recommended by the BPS (2005), all participants were given a chance 
to talk about their experiences of taking part in the research with their 
Psychologists, thus any negative emotional effects were monitored and 
addressed. After completion of the questionnaires all participants were given an 
opportunity to debrief with their Psychologist about any negative feelings 
evoked while taking part in the study. The BPS (2005) stated that “investigators 
have a primary responsibility to protect participants from physical or mental 
harm during the investigation” (p.11). Prior to commencement of the study, the 
researcher had put considerable effort to select the measures that would 
require minimum time for their administration (to reduce eventual distress 
resulting from answering questions about personal experiences), and present 
strong psychometric properties at the same time. Additionally, reflective space 
that was provided to the participants after administration of the measures aimed 
to ensure that any distress evoked while participating in the research was 
immediately acknowledged and addressed in a supportive and empathic 
manner by a qualified and trusted professional. 
 
Confidentiality in research means that all the information that participants 
provide may be used only for purposes of the study and may not be disclosed to 
others (Leary, 2004). As described in the study procedures, after the 
questionnaires had been completed, they were immediately sealed in an 
envelope together with demographic data. Consent forms were sealed 
separately. The envelopes were then posted to the researcher‟s university base 
and stored securely in locked cabinets. Personal information (consent forms) 
were stored and locked separately to the research data. The researcher did not 
have any access to participants‟ personal information. The questionnaires and 
consent forms were coded, which allowed particular set of research and 
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personal data to be securely destroyed should any participant decide to 
withdraw from the study. 
 
Salkind (2000) urged researchers to share the results of the study with the 
participants as soon and practical as possible. The research results were 
disseminated among the Clinical Psychologists who had recruited participants 
for the study. All participants were given a possibility to be informed about the 
research outcomes. Those who had expressed their interest in the results were 
contacted by their Psychologists and briefed on the study outcomes. 
 
Extended Results 
 
Participants’ Demographic Data 
 
Demographic data were collected from participants using Demographic 
Data Screening Sheet (see Appendix C). Of 47 recruited participants, 42 
provided demographic data. Tables 3 to 8 present detailed frequency and 
percentage statistics of the sample‟s demographic information. 
 
Table 3 
Participants’ gender – frequency table 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Female 11 23.4 
Male 31 66.0 
Not stated 5 10.6 
 
Table 4 
Participants’ age – frequency table 
Age Frequency Percent 
18 – 29 15 31.9 
30 – 39 9 19.1 
40 – 49 13 27.7 
50 – 59 4 8.5 
60 – 69 1 2.1 
Not stated 5 10.6 
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Table 5 
Participants’ relationship status – frequency table 
Relationship status Frequency Percent 
Single 34 72.3 
Married 4 8.5 
Divorced 4 8.5 
Not stated 5 10.6 
 
Table 6 
Participants’ employment status – frequency table 
Employment status Frequency Percent 
Unemployed 32 68.1 
Employed part-time 3 6.4 
Employed full-time 1 2.1 
Full-time student 3 6.4 
Homemaker / carer 2 4.3 
Retired 1 2.1 
Not stated 5 10.6 
 
Table 7 
Participants’ ethnicity – frequency table 
Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
White British 39 83.0 
White Irish 2 4.3 
Black British – Caribbean 1 2.1 
Not stated 5 10.6 
 
Table 8 
Participants’ patient status – frequency table 
Patient status Frequency Percent 
In-patient 13 27.7 
Out-patient 29 61.7 
Not stated 5 10.6 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive data, including dispersion, central tendency and distribution 
statistics, for the study model variables are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Descriptive statistics for the study model variables 
Statistics PPI* Depression Anxiety Positive 
affect 
Life 
satisfaction 
Mean 3.06 1.58 1.48 2.96 16.40 
Mean SE 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.25 1.03 
Median 3.20 1.50 1.50 3.00 15.00 
Mode 1.00 2.67 1.50 5.00 13.00 
SD 1.73 1.04 0.99 1.73 7.11 
Variance 3.00 1.09 0.98 2.99 50.68 
Skewness 0.19 0.17 0.24 -0.48 0.44 
Skew SE 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Kurtosis -0.85 -1.15 -0.95 -0.99 -0.63 
Kurt. SE 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Range 7.00 3.33 3.33 5.00 28.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
Maximum 7.00 3.33 3.33 5.00 33.00 
Note. (*) Psychoticism and paranoid ideation. 
 
It appears interesting that although most of the study participants were 
single (72.3%) and unemployed (68.1%), and over 27% were in-patients in 
specialist psychiatric wards, the range of reported positive affect levels and 
satisfaction with life levels were wide. The sample scores range on the 
dimensions of positive affect and life satisfaction indicated that individuals 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia may feel very joyful and extremely 
satisfied with their lives. This finding seems to support the four-dimension model 
of SWB and psychological distress that focuses on internal emotional processes 
of an individual rather than on external factors. This appears to further support 
some of conclusions drawn from positive psychology research regarding the 
role of objective indicators of happiness, which have been summarised in the 
thesis. 
 
Normality of Distribution Tests 
 
As proposed by Field (2009), in samples of 30 or more, score distribution 
tends to be normal. Nevertheless, normality of the score distribution was 
investigated for each variable in the study model. Initially, the values of 
skewness and kurtosis were investigated. In a perfect normal distribution both 
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values should be zero. The further the values are from zero, the more likely it is 
that the data are not normally distributed (Field, 2009). In the present study, the 
skewness values were as follows: 0.19 for psychoticism and paranoid ideation, 
0.17 for depression, 0.24 for anxiety, -0,48 for positive affect, and 0,44 for life 
satisfaction. The skewness values for the first three variables were close to 
zero. The positive affect scores were expected to be slightly piled-up on the 
right of the distribution, whereas the life satisfaction scores on the left. The 
kurtosis values were as follows: -0.85 for psychoticism and paranoid ideation, -
1.15 for depression, -0.95 for anxiety, -0,99 for positive affect, and -0,63 for life 
satisfaction. The negative kurtosis values indicated flat and light-tailed 
distributions. 
 
Subsequently, histograms with normal curves and P-P (probability-
probability) plots were generated. PP graphs plot the cumulative probability of a 
variable against the cumulative probability of normal distribution (Field, 2009). 
Histograms and PP plots for the study model dimensions are presented in 
Figures 3 to 7. 
 
 
Figure 3. Histogram and PP plot for the psychoticism and paranoid ideation variable. 
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Figure 4. Histogram and PP plot for the depression variable. 
 
  
Figure 5. Histogram and PP plot for the anxiety variable. 
 
  
Figure 6. Histogram and PP plot for the positive affect variable. 
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Figure 7. Histogram and PP plot for the life satisfaction variable. 
 
The histograms for the psychoticism and paranoid ideation, depression, and 
life satisfaction variables appear to have bell-shaped curves. Although most of 
the observed residuals depicted on the P-P plots are not placed exactly on the 
normal distribution lines, they do not seem greatly deviant from the line. These 
observations appear to indicate that the sample scores on those three variables 
approximate normal distributions. However, the histograms for anxiety and 
positive affect seem to indicate that the residuals on these two variables might 
differ from a normal distribution. 
 
Therefore, additional analysis was undertaken, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) test of normality was computed for each variable in the study model, as 
presented in Table 10. The results demonstrated that the scores distribution on 
the depression, anxiety and life satisfaction variables approximated normal 
distribution. The positive affect residuals appeared significantly different from 
normal distribution (sig = 0.001). It was rather surprising to find that the K-S 
statistic for psychoticism and paranoid ideation was shown to be statistically 
significant (sig = 0.048), as well. However, as explained by Field (2009), a 
significant K-S test does not necessarily suggest whether the deviation from 
normality is enough to bias any statistical procedures that are applied to the 
data. Furthermore, the author argued that in large samples (that is 30 or more) 
the K-S statistic can be significant even when the scores are only slightly 
different from a normal distribution. These statistics should therefore always be 
interpreted in conjunction with histograms, P-P plots and the values of 
skewness and kurtosis. And in the case of the psychoticism and paranoid 
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ideation variable, the histogram, the P-P plot and the values of skewness and 
kurtosis did not indicate a major deviation from a normal distribution. 
 
Table 10 
Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test 
Variables: Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
         Statistic           Significance 
PPI* 0.129 0.048 
Depression 0.106 0.200 
Anxiety 0.094 0.200 
Positive affect 0.173 0.001 
Life satisfaction 0.122 0.079 
Note. (*) Psychoticism and paranoid ideation. 
 
 
Extended Statistical Investigation – Mediation Analyses 
 
Introduction to Mediation Analysis 
 
A variable is assumed to mediate the relationship between a predictor and 
an outcome variable if the predictor first has an effect on the mediator, which in 
turn influences the outcome variable (Miles & Shevlin, 2001). In other words, a 
mediated relationship between variables occurs if a predictor has its effect on 
the outcome variable via another variable, the mediator. 
 
As defined by MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz (2007), mediation analysis is a 
“method to increase information obtained from a research study when 
measures of the mediating process are available” (p. 598). Frazier et al. (2004) 
argued that the main purpose of mediation analysis is to investigate why an 
association between a predictor and an outcome variable exists. In descriptive 
correlational studies, mediators provide further information about how two 
variables are associated, and allow a more precise explanation of the 
relationship between those two variables (Bennett, 2000). In psychological 
research, where an individual is the relevant unit of analysis, mediators are 
often some internal properties of a person that transform the effects of a 
predictor variable in some way (Baron & Kenny, 1986). These can be some 
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behavioural, biological, psychological or social constructs that transmit the 
effect of one variable onto another variable (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
 
There is a causal chain involved in mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). A 
mediating variable is placed in a causal sequence between two other variables. 
In its simplest form, mediation represents the addition of a third variable to the 
XY relation, where firstly predictor variable (X) causes the mediator (M), and 
then M causes the outcome variable (Y), so XMY (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
The mediation model presented in Figure 8 assumes a three-variable system in 
which the following causal paths occur: a representing the relation of predictor 
variable to mediator, b representing the relation of mediator to outcome variable 
adjusted for predictor variable, and c’ representing the relation of predictor 
variable to outcome variable adjusted for mediator (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
                               a                                                                  b     
 
                                                                 c’ 
 
Figure 8. Causal chain between three variables in mediation analysis. Based on 
“Mediation Analysis”, by D.P. MacKinnon et al., 2007, Annual Review of Psychology, 
58, p. 595. 
 
There are two general types of mediational studies (MacKinnon et al., 
2007). The first type uses theory regarding mediational processes to design 
experiments. The second type of study consists of investigating how a particular 
effect occurs through the use of correlational means. In the latter type, a third 
variable is added to the analysis of a relation that occurs between predictor and 
outcome variable, in order to improve understanding of the relation or to 
determine if the relation is spurious. In this type of study, a mediator improves 
understanding of such a relation because, based on theoretical assumptions or 
previous research, it is proposed to be the integral part of the XMY causal 
sequence. 
 
Predictor variable 
Mediator 
Outcome variable 
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MacKinnon et al. (2007) proposed that two models exist when thinking of 
mediation. The first one is theoretical, corresponding to unobservable relations 
among the investigated variables. The second one is empirical, relating to 
statistical analysis of collected data. The authors stated that the key challenges 
of mediation analysis were to correctly infer the actual state of mediation from 
observations, and to use a theoretical justification to support the studied model. 
 
Therefore, the starting point to construct a mediation model is a theoretically 
informed possibility that a mediator variable occurs „between‟ the studied 
predictor and outcome variables (Bennett, 2000). Frazier et al. (2004) stated 
that decisions about potential mediators are based on previous research and 
existing theories, and are best made a priori in the design stage rather than post 
hoc. 
 
The most commonly used method to investigate mediating effects is the 
causal steps approach (MacKinnon et al., 2007). In this approach, the following 
four steps must be taken to establish that a mediated relationship exists: (1) 
predictor variable must be shown to significantly relate to the outcome variable 
using regression, (2) predictor variable must be demonstrated to significantly 
relate to mediating variable using regression, (3) using multiple regression, the 
mediator must be shown to be significantly related to the outcome variable while 
the predictor variable remains controlled, and (4) when controlling for the 
mediator, the coefficient relating the predictor variable to the outcome variable 
must be smaller (in absolute value) than the coefficient detected in step 1 (Miles 
& Shevlin, 2001), or the relationship between the predictor and the outcome 
variable must be less significant than in step 1 (Bennett, 2000). When in step 4, 
the relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome variable is 
smaller than in step 1 (but still greater than zero) and the coefficient is 
statistically significant, then the data suggest partial mediation (MacKinnon, et 
al., 2007). If, when controlling for the mediator, the effect of the predictor 
variable on the outcome variable is zero, or the relationship is at least no longer 
statistically significant, then the data are consistent with a dominant, or 
complete, mediation model (Miles & Shevlin, 2001). 
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The Present Study 
 
In the present study, the mediators have been identified on theoretical 
grounds and their choice has been also informed by previous research. Both 
theoretical and empirical justifications for the study model have been discussed 
in the main journal article and in the extended paper parts of the thesis.  
 
Based on the propositions of the four-dimension model of happiness and 
psychological distress (Figure 1, page 10) and empirical evidence describing 
elevated levels of emotional distress amongst individuals with psychosis, the 
results of the initial statistical analysis were depicted in Figure 2 (page 22). The 
research question underpinning the extended statistical analysis was about how 
emotional distress resulting from psychosis is associated with the individuals‟ 
satisfaction with life. Given the study model and the results of stages 1 and 2 of 
our statistical analysis, it was hypothesised that psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation would be associated with a person‟s life satisfaction via the mediating 
effects of depression, anxiety and positive affect (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, 
given the strength of the correlations between the dimensions within the study 
model and their significance levels, it was hypothesised that depression would 
be shown to have the strongest mediating properties of the three mediators, 
and that positive affect would have the weakest (Hypothesis 2). 
 
As argued by MacKinnon et al. (2007), mediating processes often include 
multiple mediators, which are likely to provide a more accurate estimation of 
mediation effects in a variety of research contexts. The authors explained that 
the mediation models which consist of more than one mediator are 
straightforward extensions of the single-mediator models. Derived from the 
main study model, Figure 9 depicts the three mediational sub-models, which 
were investigated separately in order to establish mediating properties for each 
of the hypothesised mediators. In the mediational sub-models, the dimension of 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation acted as predictor variable, life satisfaction 
was an outcome variable, and depression, anxiety and positive affect were 
mediating variables. 
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                           a1                                                                  b1     
 
                                                              c’1 
 
 
 
                            a2                                                                  b2     
 
                                                               c’2 
 
 
 
                            a3                                                                  b3     
 
                                                               c’3 
 
 
Figure 9. Mediational sub-models: depression, anxiety and positive affect as the 
hypothesised mediators of the association between psychosis related distress and 
satisfaction with life. 
 
Mediation Analyses’ Results 
 
The causal steps approach utilising the series of simple regressions (steps 
1 and 2) and a multiple regression (steps 3 and 4) was used to investigate 
mediating properties of the hypothesised mediators. Also, as suggested by 
Bennett (2000), in multiple regression stage of mediation analysis, both the 
predictor and mediator variables must be entered simultaneously with the 
outcome variable. Hence, the forced entry method was chosen for conducting 
multiple regressions in our mediation analyses. 
 
Table 11 summarises the statistical results for causal steps 1 to 4 of the 
mediation analysis with depression as the mediating variable. 
 
 
 
 
Psychoticism and 
paranoid ideation  
Depression 
Life satisfaction 
Anxiety 
Life satisfaction 
Positive affect 
Life satisfaction 
Psychoticism and 
paranoid ideation  
Psychoticism and 
paranoid ideation  
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 81 of 135. 
 
Table 11 
Causal steps of mediation analysis with depression as the mediating variable 
 Causal steps R square Coefficient B B significance 
Step 1 0.122 - 1.431 0.016 
Step 2 (path a1) 0.513 0.432 < 0.001 
Step 3 (path b1) 0.224 - 3.123 0.020 
Step 4 (path c’1) - - 0.082 0.917 
 
In step 1 of the first mediation analysis, psychoticism and paranoid ideation 
were shown to be significantly related to life satisfaction: B = -1.431, sig = 
0.016. Coefficient B suggested that with a single unit change in psychoticism 
and paranoid ideation, an individual‟s satisfaction with life decreased by 
approximately one and a half of units. Furthermore, based on R square value, 
psychoticism and paranoid ideation were estimated to account for 12.2% of the 
variation in the levels of life satisfaction. 
 
In step 2, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were demonstrated to be 
significantly related to depression, the mediating variable (path a1 in Figure 9): 
B = 0.432, sig < 0.001. With a single unit change in psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation, the depression levels of an individual increased by approximately a 
half of a unit. Also, psychoticism and paranoid ideation were shown to account 
for 51.3% of variance in depression levels. 
 
In step 3, when controlling for psychoticism and paranoid ideation, 
depression was demonstrated to be significantly related to life satisfaction (path 
b1 in Figure 9): B = - 3.123, sig = 0.020. Coefficient B value suggested that 
when psychoticism and paranoid ideation is controlled, with a single unit change 
in depression, an individual‟s life satisfaction decreased by more than three 
units. Furthermore, when controlling for the predictor variable, depression was 
shown to account for 22.4% of variance in life satisfaction. 
 
In step 4, when controlling for the mediator, the predictor variable‟s 
association with the outcome variable (path c‟1 in Figure 9) was shown to be 
close to zero and statistically non-significant: B = -0.082, sig = 0.917. The 
results suggest that when controlling for depression, the change in life 
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satisfaction associated with a single unit change in psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation was close to zero and, in addition, was statistically non-significant. 
According to the methodology described by Miles and Shelvin (2001), the 
amount of mediation was estimated by calculating the difference between the 
absolute values of coefficients in steps 1 and 4. The amount of mediation was 
therefore 1.349, which accounted for 94.26% of the initial B coefficient. 
Consequently, the data were consistent with a dominant mediation model 
suggesting that depression acts as a dominant mediator in the relationship 
between psychoticism and paranoid ideation (predictor variable) and life 
satisfaction (outcome variable). However, if dominant mediating role of 
depression was to be supported with further evidence, then both anxiety and 
positive affect would be shown as statistically non-significant mediators in the 
current study model. 
 
Table 12 summarises the statistical outcomes of the mediation analysis with 
anxiety as the mediating variable. 
 
Table 12 
Causal steps of mediation analysis with anxiety as the mediating variable 
Causal steps R square Coefficient B B significance 
Step 1 0.122 - 1.431 0.016 
Step 2 (path a2) 0.519 0.412 < 0.001 
Step 3 (path b2) 0.164 - 2.130 0.143 
 
Given that the predictor and outcome variables were the same in each of 
the mediation analyses, the results of causal step 1 also remained the same. In 
step 2 of the second mediation analysis, psychoticism and paranoid ideation 
were shown to be significantly related to anxiety (path a2 in Figure 9): B = 
0.412, sig < 0.001. Coefficient B value suggested that with a single unit change 
in psychoticism and paranoid ideation, the anxiety levels of an individual 
increased by almost a half of a unit. Moreover, psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation were shown to account for 51.9% of variance in anxiety levels. 
 
However, in step 3, when controlling for psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation, anxiety was demonstrated to no longer have a significant relationship 
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with life satisfaction (path b2 in Figure 9), as the significance level of coefficient 
B was 0.143. Therefore, step 4 of the second mediation analysis could not be 
undertaken, which suggested that anxiety was not a statistically significant 
mediator of the relationship between the predictor and the outcome variable. 
 
Table 13 presents statistical results of mediation analysis with positive 
affect as the mediating variable. 
 
Table 13 
Causal steps of mediation analysis with positive affect as the mediating variable. 
Causal steps R square Coefficient B B significance 
Step 1 0.122 - 1.431 0.016 
Step 2 (path a3) 0.048 - 0.219 0.139 
 
In step 2 of the third mediational analysis, psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation were shown not to act as a significant predictor of positive affect (path 
a3 in Figure 9). Hence, causal steps 3 and 4 of our third mediation analysis 
could not be undertaken, and the data suggested that positive affect was not a 
statistically significant mediator either. 
 
Discussion of Mediation Analyses’ Results 
 
The results of mediational analyses were consistent with a dominant 
mediation model and suggested that depression acted as a dominant mediator 
in the relationship between psychoticism and paranoid ideation (predictor 
variable) and life satisfaction (outcome variable). The reported statistical 
analysis therefore showed only partial support for the hypotheses. Although, it 
was predicted that depression would be shown to have the strongest mediating 
properties of the three mediators, and positive affect the weakest (Hypothesis 
2), given the correlations between the study model dimensions (as presented in 
Figure 2, page 22), we expected anxiety and positive affect to act as partial 
mediators as well (Hypothesis 1). However, given that the correlation coefficient 
between the dimensions of psychoticism/paranoid ideation and positive affect 
was shown to be weak and statistically non-significant, it is more 
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understandable that positive affect did not have any significant mediating 
properties. Moreover, this finding is consistent with suppositions of the four-
dimension model of happiness and psychological distress, in which positive and 
negative affect are separate and only moderately correlated entities that coexist 
with each other. 
 
Given the size and significance levels of anxiety correlation coefficients with 
both the predictor and the outcome variables (presented in Figure 2 and in 
Table 1, pages 22-23), the results of the second mediation analysis (suggesting 
no significant mediating effects for anxiety), were more surprising. However, 
again, the possible explanation for this finding appears to be placed within the 
empirical foundations of the four-dimension model reported by Headey and 
Wearing (1992). The authors argued that although depression and anxiety were 
both major influences on SWB (i.e. through their inverse effect on a sense of 
satisfaction, and on frequency of positive emotions), the two main forms of 
psychological distress were at least partly independent, and while individuals 
could be satisfied with their lives and anxious, it was very rare to find people 
who were both satisfied and depressed. 
 
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that, since psychological processes 
have a variety of causes, a more reasonable objective would be to seek 
mediators that significantly decrease the relationship between the predictor 
variable and the outcome variable, rather than eliminating the relationship 
completely. MacKinnon et al. (2007) agreed that it is often unrealistic to expect 
that a single mediating variable would be a dominant, let alone complete, 
explanation of the relationship. On the other hand, Zhao, Lynch and Chen 
(2010) argued that partial mediation can often reflect an unknown and 
unmeasured second mediator. Therefore, the authors suggested that if the 
hypothesised causal XMY chain was to be supported with statistical 
evidence then once the mediator is controlled, there should be no partial effect 
of predictor variable on the outcome variable. Consequently, if a study model 
allows for the possibility that the predictor may affect the outcome variable 
„directly‟ as well as indirectly, when the mediator is controlled the relationship 
between the predictor and the outcome variables should only be weaker than 
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the initial relationship between these variables when M is not controlled. Zhao et 
al. (2010) argued further that although there should always be a prior theoretical 
reason to expect an indirect mediated effect, the concept of direct effect is 
clearly statistical, and the strongest evidence for mediation is provided when 
there is no partial effect once mediator is controlled. The authors argued that 
there is no reason to hypothesise any direct effects a priori, and the direct path 
remains theoretically unexplained (i.e. this is an artefact). If such a direct effect 
remains even when the mediator is controlled in multiple regression, it may be 
interpreted as evidence of the effect of one or more unknown and unmeasured 
mediators. In a case when a mediated effect exists and there is no direct effect 
remaining in the final step of the mediation analysis, instead of using terms such 
as „complete‟ or „dominant‟ mediation, Zhao et al. (2010) proposed using the 
term „indirect-only‟ mediation, which serves as a more accurate guide to 
discussing the implications of the results for theory and practice. 
 
In the present study, the results of mediational analyses fitted in with the 
dominant mediation model, and depression was shown to be the dominant 
mediator of the relationship between psychosis related distress (measured on 
the scales of psychoticism and paranoid ideation) and satisfaction with life. The 
data supported the indirect-only XMY mediation type, in which an increase 
in the levels of psychoticism and paranoid ideation (X) would reduce an 
individual‟s satisfaction with life (Y) only if accompanied by the increase in the 
depression levels (M). The concept of the direct XY effect was evidently 
statistical, and served to establish the mediating properties of the other 
variables. Given the empirical foundations of the four-dimension model of 
happiness and psychological distress (Headey & Wearing, 1992), and the 
theoretical assumptions of the cognitive model of psychosis (Fowler ae al., 
1995; Chadwick et al., 1996), the indirect-only XMY relationship appears to 
fit in with the current knowledge more accurately. 
 
Frazier et al. (2004) argued that when interpreting the results of mediational 
analysis, the issue of an „alternative equivalent model‟ must be acknowledged. 
That is, for any given mediational model there are likely to be alternative models 
with different patterns of relations amongst the investigated variables that are 
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consistent with the data. As noticed by MacKinnon et al. (2007), “although the 
consideration of a third variable may appear simple, three-variable systems can 
be very complicated, and there are many alternative explanations of observed 
relations other that mediation” (p. 595). 
 
In principle, the four-dimension model of SWB and psychological distress 
chosen for the purpose of the study is only one of a number of happiness 
concepts, and the cognitive viewpoint on emotional distress in psychosis is not 
the only available one. However, the choice of the study model has been 
supported with empirical evidence, which was reported adequately within the 
frames of the thesis. Yet, it is important to remember that although depression 
was shown to be the dominant mediator between the predictor and the outcome 
variable, psychoticism and paranoid ideation accounted only for 12.2% of the 
variation in the levels of life satisfaction amongst the individuals with psychosis. 
Moreover, when controlling for the predictor variable, depression accounted for 
22.4% of variance in life satisfaction. It is therefore important for future research 
to focus on establishing the other determinants of satisfaction with life of people 
experiencing psychosis. Both internal (personal, psychological) and external 
(objective) variables might be considered in future research. For instance, 
theory of optimal experience described in detail by Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 
1997, 2002) may serve as an „alternative equivalent model‟ and provide some 
indications for additional personal determinants of life satisfaction amongst 
individuals with severe mental health difficulties (e.g. engagement, involvement 
and absorption in activities), which might inform the future research focus. On 
the other hand, there has been an ongoing debate taking place in the positive 
psychology literature on the subject of objective determinants of SWB, and 
some conclusions from the debate (i.e. these regarding the relatively minimal 
importance of the external factors in comparison with individual and 
psychological ones) have been reported within the thesis. However, as argued 
by Romme (1993), Chadwick (1997), James (2001), and Read (2004 d) it is 
fundamentally important to address the objective disadvantages and 
widespread stigmatisation that people with psychosis are subjected to, as well 
as to focus on their individual human strengths (Carr, 2005). 
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Furthermore, the causal steps process of conducted mediational analyses 
seemed too prescriptive and appeared to imply that if the statistical 
assumptions of causal steps were met and a series of regressions were 
conducted, then a definite answer about mediating effects would be provided. 
Bramwell (1996) argued that since mediation analysis relies on correlational 
techniques, rather than on the manipulation of cause and effect in an 
experimental or at least quasi-experimental way, it cannot provide any „proof‟ 
that the direction of causality is that which a researcher predicts. Similarly, 
Bryman and Cramer (2001) proposed that a correlational study cannot establish 
the causal effects and the generation of causal explanations from correlational 
research can be meaningless; these effects can only be inferred. Frazier et al. 
(2004) argued that since causal inferences generally cannot be made on the 
basis of non-experimental studies, then with correlational data exploratory 
procedures can be interpreted merely in correlational terms and the only 
conclusion that can be made is that the causal model is consistent with the 
data. Bryman and Cramer (2001) suggested that in order to make inferences 
about the likely direction of cause and effect, “the researcher must look to 
probable directions of causation... or to theories which suggest that certain 
variables are more likely to proceed others” (p. 229). In addition, Kenny (2008) 
argued that, given the causal assumption that underlies a mediational analysis, 
if the study model is misspecified, then the mediation analysis‟ results are not 
so much meaningless, but rather misleading. It is, therefore, of major 
importance for any researcher to justify the assumptions that have been made 
in any mediational model. 
 
In the present study, the justification for causational directions in 
mediational models was established on the grounds of previous empirical 
research, as described in theoretical introduction of the journal paper and in the 
extended part of the thesis. It is only argued here that the indirect causational 
model with depression acting as the mediator was consistent with the data. It is 
also acknowledged that the presented findings can only be interpreted in 
correlational terms, and the researcher does not claim to provide any „proof‟ for 
the direction of causality. 
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Nonetheless, Kenny (2008) strongly disagreed with the idea that 
experimental studies are the only legitimate design for drawing causal 
conclusions. The author argued that the experimental requirement of 
manipulation prevents studying many variables of which manipulation is 
unethical. Moreover, if the mediators are internal psychological processes, then 
these variables can only be measured and not manipulated. Hence, Kenny 
(2008) concluded that “if we can only study variables that we manipulate, we 
have a science that artificially limits itself from studying as causes variables that 
cannot be manipulated” (p. 356). The points Kenny made were very important in 
the context of the present study. Given the study‟s subject, the idea of 
constructing an experiment in which variables such as psychoticism and 
paranoid ideation, depression or anxiety are in any way „manipulated‟ appears 
highly unethical, if at all possible. 
 
Statistical Assumptions of the Mediation Analysis and Multiple 
Regression Models 
 
MacKinnon et al. (2007) argued that a correctly specified mediation model 
must meet the following four assumptions: (1) no misspecification of the causal 
XMY order, (2) no misspecification of causal direction, (3) no 
misspecification due to unmeasured variables that cause variables in the 
mediation analysis, and (4) no misspecification due to imperfect measurement. 
At the same time, the authors acknowledged however that in most situations 
these assumptions may be difficult to test and may even be untestable, so that 
proof of a mediating relation is impossible. “A more realistic approach is to 
incorporate additional information from prior research..., theory, and qualitative 
methods to bolster the tentative conclusion that a mediation relation exists” 
(MacKinnon et al., p. 602). Furthermore, Bryman and Cramer (2001) noticed 
that it is only possible to control for those variables which occur to a researcher 
as potentially pertinent in the context of the study, and which are relatively easy 
to measure. “Other variables will constitute further contaminating factors, but 
the effects of these are unknown” (p. 229). 
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As previously stated, in the present study the causational directions in 
mediation models were hypothesised on the grounds of previous empirical 
research and relevant theories. These were presented in theoretical introduction 
of the journal paper and in the extended part of the thesis. Furthermore, a 
number of conclusions from the field of positive psychology on the subject of 
importance of objective indicators of SWB (in this study, the unmeasured 
variables) were reported in the journal paper discussion and in the extended 
part of the thesis. Consequently, it is the view of the author that the exclusion of 
those variables from the study model has been justified. However, the issue of 
an „alternative equivalent model‟ has been acknowledged and the possible 
directions for the future research were proposed. Moreover, the choice of the 
measures for the present study was made on the grounds of their sound 
psychometric properties, which were reported in detail in the main journal 
paper. 
 
The assumptions of the multiple regression model were also tested. To be 
able to generalise from the regression model, a number of underlying 
assumptions must be met, which include: variable types, non-zero variance, no 
perfect multicollinearity, independent errors, homoscedasticity, linearity, and 
uncorrelated external variables (Field, 2009, Foster et al., 2006). These will now 
be discussed. 
 
The criterion needs to be a quantitative normally distributed variable (Howitt 
& Cramer, 2008). Furthermore, predictor variables must be at least categorical 
and should have some variation in value; but they do not need to be normally 
distributed (Field, 2009). Normality of scores distribution has been already 
discussed in the extended part of the thesis. Satisfaction with life, as measured 
by the SWLS, is a quantitative variable measured on a semi-interval scale. All 
predictors, as measured by the BSI and the ABS, are quantitative semi-interval 
variables. 
 
As explained by Field (2009), to meet the assumption of no perfect 
multicollinearity, there should be no perfect linear relationship between the 
predictors, which in practice means that the correlation coefficients between the 
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predictors should be below 0.9 in their absolute values. On the other hand, 
given the assumptions of a mediational model, the predictor variable is 
assumed to cause the mediator, so these two variables should be correlated on 
a statistically significant level. Consequently, the presence of such a correlation 
results in multicollinearity, in which the effects of predictor variable and mediator 
on the outcome variable are estimated (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Nonetheless, 
the assumption of no perfect multicollinearity has been met, as correlation 
coefficients between the predictors in the present study were all below 0.9 in 
their absolute values, as presented in Figure 2 (page 22). Furthermore, as 
recommended by Foster et al. (2006), multicollinearity in multiple regression 
models was also assessed using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance 
statistics in SPSS. These statistics are reported in Table 14. Given that both VIF 
values were less than 10 and tolerance statistics were above 0.2 then there was 
no indication for concern (Field, 2009).  
 
Table 14 
Multicollinearity statistics for multiple regressions in mediation analyses 1 and 2 
Multiple regression model VIF Tolerance 
Mediation analysis 1 2.050 0.487 
Mediation analysis 2 2.080 0.481 
 
To meet the assumption of non-zero variance, the predictors must have 
some variation in value (Field, 2009). Dispersion statistics were used to 
investigate this assumption (Foster et al., 2006). These statistics were already 
reported in Table 9 (page 68) and indicated non-zero variance for each of the 
variables. 
 
The assumption of independent errors was investigated with the Durbin-
Watson statistics, which are summarised in Table 15. A conservative rule 
suggested that values less that 1 or greater than 3 indicate a violation of the 
assumption; the closer to 2 the values are the better (Field, 2009). Both 
statistics approximated 2, therefore the assumption of independent errors was 
met. 
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Table 15 
Durbin-Watson tests for multiple regressions in mediation analyses 1 and 2 
Multiple regression model Durbin-Watson 
Mediation analysis 1 1.992 
Mediation analysis 2 1.835 
 
Homoscedasticity requires all residuals at each level of predictors to have 
the same variance. Also, the assumption of linearity entails that the modelled 
relationship is a linear one. As recommended by Field (2009), the scatterplots of 
*ZRESID (i.e. Regression Standardized Residual) by *ZPRED (i.e. Regression 
Standardized Predicted Value) were produced for multiple regressions in order 
to investigate the homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions. The scatterplots 
are presented in Figures 10 and 11. The points on both graphs appear 
randomly and evenly dispersed throughout the scatterplots. The patterns 
therefore indicate that the assumptions of both homoscedasticity and linearity 
were met. 
 
Figure 10. Scatterplot for multiple regression in mediation analysis 1 (predictors: 
psychoticism/paranoid ideation and depression). 
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Figure 11. Scatterplot for multiple regression in mediation analysis 2 (predictors: 
psychoticism/paranoid ideation and anxiety). 
  
Although Field (2009) stated that predictors should not be correlated with 
external variables, he also acknowledged that some authors treat these 
variables as parts of an error term that includes any random factor in the way in 
which the outcome varies. On the other hand, Leary (2004) argued that 
“because correlational research cannot control or eliminate extraneous 
variables, correlated variables are naturally confounded” (p.180). The issue of 
external variables (that is, objective indicators of individual SWB) has already 
been discussed on a number of occasions throughout the thesis, and some 
justification for their exclusion from the study model has been provided. Also, 
the researcher has acknowledged a possibility of an „alternative equivalent 
model‟ and proposed some possible directions for the future research. 
 
Effect Size and Statistical Power 
 
As suggested by MacKinnon et al. (2007), standardised regression 
coefficients may serve as effect size measures for individual relations in 
mediation analyses. Table 16 presents standardised coefficients Beta for steps 
1 to 4 of mediation analyses in the present study. Significance levels of the 
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coefficients correspond to those reported for B coefficients in Tables 11 to 13 
(pages 77-79). 
 
Table 16  
Standardised coefficients Beta for steps 1 to 4 of mediation analyses in the present 
study 
 Mediation 
analysis 1 
Mediation 
analysis 2 
Mediation 
analysis 3 
Coefficient Beta for step 1 - 0.349 - 0.349 - 0.349 
Coefficient Beta for step 2 0.716 0.721 - 0.219 
Coefficient Beta for step 3 - 0.459 - 0.297 --- 
Coefficient Beta for step 4 - 0.020 --- --- 
 
In the present study, the statistical power of the multiple regression stages 
of mediational analyses was computed using the G*Power software programme 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). G*Power required however that the 
effect size was calculated using the f² statistic. Coolican (2004) suggested the 
following f² equation:  f² = R² / (1 – R²). The results of power calculations are 
presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Statistical power of the multiple regression stages of mediational analyses 1 and 2 
Power calculation Multiple regression stage 
of mediation analysis 1 
Multiple regression stage 
of mediation analysis 2 
f² effect size  0.235 0.129 
α error probability 0.05 0.05 
Predictors no. 2 2 
Sample size 47 47 
Statistical power 
(1-β error prob.) 
0.948 0.782 
 
 
Extended Discussion 
 
Findings in the Context of Previous Research 
 
Discussions of the findings in the context of previous research, both positive 
and traditional clinical psychology, were already presented in the journal article 
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and the extended part of the thesis. Additional reflections will now be 
considered. 
 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) argued that given the long 
established pathological bias of most research in the field of clinical psychology, 
much more is known about how negative emotions and experiences lead to 
distress and illness than is known about how positive emotions promote health 
and wellbeing. As argued by authors such as Chadwick (1997), James (2001), 
and Campbell (2007), especially in the speciality of severe mental health 
difficulties and psychosis, the research appears to be traditionally informed by a 
medical model of „mental illness‟ and focused on pathology, which consequently 
has had dismissing, stigmatising, discriminatory and marginalising effects on 
the individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia who have been perceived as „not 
normal‟ and substantially different in comparison with those from, so called, 
non-clinical population. 
 
The establishment of the positive applied psychology (Linley & Joseph, 
2004) and the positive clinical psychology (Maddux et al., 2004; Joseph & 
Linley, 2006) movements have been an inevitable response to the negativistic 
and medicalised orientation of traditional clinical psychology research studies. 
Conway and MacLeod (2002) advocated for clinical incorporation of SWB ideas 
into the current symptom-oriented settings amongst those with severe 
psychological difficulties. The author of the present study attempts to pursue the 
developing science of positive psychology in clinical research, and the current 
investigation aspires to extend the positive clinical psychology focus onto the 
disadvantaged individuals with severe mental health difficulties, namely those 
with the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 
 
In the present study, the concept of SWB, or happiness, which so far 
seemed to be restricted for (that is, studied exclusively amongst) those from 
„normal‟ and „non-clinical‟ populations, was examined with individuals diagnosed 
with paranoid schizophrenia. The suppositions of the four-dimension model of 
SWB and psychological distress were investigated, and the results suggested 
that the model applies not only to individuals from the general population, but 
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also to people with severe mental health difficulties, namely psychosis. Indeed, 
the experiences of happiness amongst people diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia appear to be governed by mechanisms similar to those of 
general population. Furthermore, as indicated by the range of the sample 
scores on the dimensions of positive affect and life satisfaction it is understood 
that individuals experiencing psychosis may even feel very joyful and extremely 
satisfied with their lives. The findings therefore suggest, that individuals 
traditionally perceived as having „abnormal‟ and „pathological‟ experiences, are 
indeed no different from people representing so called non-clinical populations 
in the sense that they also posses strengths and virtues, and like any human 
being, are capable of experiencing joy and being satisfied with their lives even 
in the face of adverse experiences related to being diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia or being hospitalised. 
 
It seems important to ask the question about how might traditional clinical 
psychology explain the fact that, despite all the difficulties, objective 
disadvantages and stigma attached to the mental illness diagnoses, the studied 
individuals managed on average to live their lives with enjoyment and 
satisfaction? Unfortunately, as stated by Sheldon and King (2001), clinical 
psychologists know very little about the nature of human wellbeing and about 
the essence of positive emotions. However, the still young and developing 
science of positive psychology may suggest some answers. Linley and Joseph 
(2004) argued that instead of detecting varied nuances of human behaviour as 
being representative of underlying psychopathology, positive clinical 
psychologists focus on human strengths, capacities and resources, the key 
assets that allow them to survive, despite the obstacles they might face. A 
decade ago, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) described a number of 
studies, which demonstrated that emotions have direct effects on physiology 
and the immune system, and indirect effects on marshalling psychological and 
social resources and shaping the motivation to health-promoting behaviour. 
Furthermore, Gable and Haidt (2005) presented some evidence that positive 
processes may shield people from negative emotional experiences. The 
answers can also be found in the four-dimension model of SWB and 
psychological distress itself (Headey & Wearing, 1992). As positive emotions 
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are generally inversely correlated with negative emotions, substituting the 
former for the latter may bring therapeutic and preventive effects, and maintain 
fair levels of satisfaction with life. In the present study, this indeed seemed to be 
the case. Although, the levels of psychoticism, paranoid ideation, depression 
and anxiety were clearly elevated, the studied individuals were on average only 
slightly dissatisfied with their lives, and appeared to maintain the levels of 
positive affect similar to the general British norms. These results suggested that 
happiness amongst people with experiences of psychosis, as conceptualised 
through the four-dimensional model, is governed by the same mechanisms as 
amongst those from so called non-clinical population. This seemed to confirm 
further that people who were traditionally perceived as disabled by the 
experiences of their „illness‟, indeed have strengths and assets, just like anyone 
else. 
 
Additionally, the current study has shown that having experiences of 
psychosis does not automatically make people unhappy or unsatisfied. 
Therefore, the results of the current study appear to provide further support for 
the cognitive model of psychosis (e.g. Fowler et al., 1995), which advocates the 
idiosyncratic view (in opposition to the homogeneous perception dictated by the 
medical model of mental illness) of psychosis. Indeed, the present study‟s 
results suggested that individuals with experiences of psychosis, additionally 
suffering from objective disadvantages, such as hospitalisation or stigma 
attached to the labels of paranoid schizophrenia, are able to experience joy and 
to be satisfied with their lives. It is important to note here, that the researcher‟s 
cognitive perspective of psychosis has not only been implicit in this study, but 
has also been conveyed in the process of measurement of psychosis related 
distress. The already described A-B-C model of psychosis proposed that: (A) a 
specific activating event, such as a hallucination, is (B) appraised and 
interpreted by an individual in a situational context, and effects in (C) the 
associated levels of distress (Chadwick et al., 1996; Dudley & Kuyken, 2006). In 
the present study, the BSI inventory scales of psychoticism and paranoid 
ideation were utilised to measure the psychosis related distress levels. The 
participants were asked to describe how much they were distressed or bothered 
by the experiences specified on both scales during the past 7 days including the 
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day of the measurement (Derogatis, 1993). Therefore, given the A-B-C model of 
psychosis, the „C‟ was measured. To measure the „As‟, that is symptoms of 
schizophrenia as an illness, and suggest that those symptoms would have a 
direct effect of individuals‟ life satisfaction, would be to hypothesise that the 
medical ideology of mental illness was true, with which the researcher explicitly 
disagrees and, instead, advocates for an idiosyncratic and heterogeneous 
approach to experiences of psychosis. Cognitive understanding of psychosis 
appears to treat each individual on their own merits, which stays in line with the 
positive clinical psychology approach advocated in this thesis. As explained by 
Linley and Joseph (2004), applied positive psychology is not prescriptive in the 
sense that it dictates specific interventions; it is rather facilitative in the way that 
it helps individuals achieve their own personal objectives. 
 
Further Discussion of Clinical Implications 
 
Several clinical implications were already stated in the discussion 
paragraph of the main journal paper. The additional clinical implications will now 
be discussed. 
 
Research studies, as already reported in the thesis, have consistently 
shown a high prevalence of affective difficulties amongst people with 
experiences of psychosis (e.g. Marneros & Akiskal, 2007; Altamura, Dragogna, 
Pozzoli & Mauri, 2009). Depression appears the most frequently reported 
emotional response amongst those diagnosed with schizophrenia (e.g. Siris, 
1991; Gaebel, Bittner & Wolwer, 2007). The present study suggests that, having 
an imperative and the central influence on SWB, depression is a very powerful 
emotional experience amongst individuals with psychosis. The results of the 
mediational analyses conducted within the present study suggested that 
depression is the dominant mediator of the inverse relationship between 
psychosis related distress and individual satisfaction with life. Therefore, its 
influence on SWB of individuals with experiences of psychosis appears 
essential, even central. 
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Hence, as already mentioned in the discussion paragraph of the journal 
paper, the provision of an effective psychological therapy for depression seems 
of major importance for individuals with psychosis in order to enhance their 
SWB. Given the supportive outcomes of the reviews of studies on the 
effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for depression (e.g. 
Barkham & Parry, 2008), it is assumed that traditional clinical psychology has 
an evidence based tool to assist the clients in alleviating their depressive 
experiences. Meta-analytic review of research studies conducted by Roth and 
Fonagy (2005) demonstrated that the efficacy of CBT for depression has been 
favourable when compared with no therapy and with other less structured 
interventions. Also, examples of individual studies have shown that: (1) a 
considerably higher proportion of clients who completed CBT achieved clinically 
significant reduction in depression symptoms (71.4%) compared with only 13% 
of non-completers (Cahill et al., 2003), (2) CBT considerably reduced sad affect, 
daily negative automatic thoughts and unhelpful attitudes (Furlong & Oei, 2002; 
Parrish et al., 2009), and (3) helped depressed individuals achieve full 
remission at one year follow-up (Barton, Armstrong, Freeston & Twaddle, 
2008). 
 
However, as already discussed in detail, the input of traditional clinical 
psychology practitioners ends when the high levels of depression are 
ameliorated (e.g. Sheldon & King, 2001). Conway and MacLeod (2002) argued 
that well-being and positive experiential aspects differ considerably from the 
mere absence of negative experiences, and that positive experiences are 
related to protection and recovery from depression. Furthermore, Ruini and 
Fava (2004) reported some studies which suggested that an increase in 
psychological wellbeing may protect against relapse and recurrence of 
depression, and that the route to lasting recovery lies not exclusively in 
alleviating the negative symptoms, but in creating and maintaining positive 
experiences. Hence, the authors postulated for incorporation of the concept of 
SWB into the definition of recovery from any form of psychological suffering. It 
has already been stated that positive clinical psychologists may work both to 
alleviate distress and to promote optimal functioning, and these are not distinct 
or separate roles. However, when the distress has been alleviated, the role of 
1011, RES, UofN: 4092655, UofL: 08127480, Research Project, 
Page 99 of 135. 
 
applied positive psychologists is not complete. As argued by Linley and Joseph 
(2004), positive clinical psychologists aim to facilitate their clients‟ development 
fully until the point of optimal functioning by moving them beyond the absence 
of psychopathology. From the perspective of positive psychology, a clinical 
intervention is not completed until wellbeing is present. This approach serves to 
buffer subsequent stresses, hence it has a preventive function (Runi & Fava, 
2004). 
 
This is not to suggest that depression should be addressed somehow 
independently or instead of the symptoms of psychosis within the course of 
psychotherapeutic intervention. As already discussed, cognitive models of 
psychosis recognize depression as an understandable response to positive 
symptoms and incorporate psychological distress into the overall picture of 
psychosis (Fowler et al., 1995, Chadwick et al., 1996). This is mirrored within 
the types of cognitive-behavioural interventions offered to individuals with 
psychosis, which do not differ considerably from those offered in depression. 
These include: psychoeducation about cognitive and emotional processes 
underlying and maintaining the symptoms, development of strategies to 
recognise and challenge negative thoughts and beliefs, recognising stressors 
and coping with triggers for mood changes, behavioural activation to battle 
boredom and inactivity, setting goals in life and developing plans to attain them 
(Johns, Sellwood, McGovern & Haddock, 2002), modification of negative 
thinking through seeking alternative explanations, development of calming and 
relaxation strategies, learning distraction strategies (Collerton & Dudley, 2004), 
completing regular homework assignments to recognise and monitor unhelpful 
beliefs and emotional responses (Rector, 2007), disconfirming unhelpful 
behaviours through behavioural experiments (Hagen & Nordahl, 2008), 
promoting social interaction and inclusion, identification and modification of 
safety behaviours (Valmaggia, Tabraham, Morris & Bouman, 2008), and 
utilisation of therapeutic relationship to develop collaboration and sound working 
alliance (Evans-Jones et al., 2009). As depression often appears to be an 
integral part of psychosis rather than a completely separate entity requiring a 
separate treatment, the interventions listed above will target and address the 
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underlying cognitive and behavioural processes of both depression and the 
experiences of psychosis. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued here that, given the results of the present study 
suggesting that individuals with psychosis are as capable of experiencing 
positive emotions and of being as satisfied with their lives as any person from 
the general population, clinical interventions based on the positive psychology 
values are also applicable to people with severe mental health difficulties. It is 
also postulated that these individuals are as deserving of being provided with 
the evidence based tools to increase their happiness as anyone else. And the 
positive clinical psychology movement appears to have developed some 
applicable interventions. 
 
Maddux at al. (2004) explained that positive clinical psychology 
assessments and interventions do not differ from those grounded in the illness 
model in terms of particular strategies or tactics. In fact, more often than not, the 
positive psychology strategies borrow from those that have proven useful as 
traditional psychological treatments. The difference is placed in the domains of 
psychological functioning that are the focus of assessments and in the specific 
changes in psychological functioning that interventions are designed to 
facilitate. That is, positive psychological assessments and interventions focus 
on the enhancement of people‟s strengths and assets in addition to, and in 
times instead, the alleviation of psychological distress. 
 
Nevertheless, Ruini and Fava (2004) presented a protocol for Wellbeing 
Therapy (WBT), which is a structured, short-term psychotherapeutic strategy 
based on an educational model and cognitive theory. In WBT a client is 
encouraged to identify episodes of wellbeing (even very short ones), and to 
recognise and challenge the thoughts and beliefs which have led to the 
premature interruption of wellbeing. The activities that are likely to elicit SWB 
are then encouraged and reinforced. Preliminary validation studies of WBT with 
residual phase of affective disorders, such as depression, were also reported by 
the authors. The participants were assigned randomly to either WBT or CBT. 
The results suggested that both therapies were associated with a significant 
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reduction of symptoms. However, when the residual symptoms were compared 
after treatment, WBT was shown to have an advantage over CBT. The authors 
concluded that while in the acute phase of affective illness removal of 
symptoms may yield the most substantial changes, the enhancement of positive 
experiences appears more effective in its residual phase. 
 
The results of the studies conducted by Ruini and Fava (2004) appear 
substantially important for the discussion of the present study. They suggest 
when the traditional psychological treatments, such as CBT, may have an 
advantage over the more contemporary methods, and when the positive 
psychology interventions, such as WBT, seem more beneficial. It appears 
reasonable to propose that the individuals with psychosis who experience high 
levels of depression should first be provided with a psychological therapy that 
targets the experiences of depression, in order to alleviate psychological 
distress. After the depression levels have been alleviated, it seems plausible to 
suggest that in order to improve the client‟s SWB and life satisfaction, a positive 
clinical psychology intervention, such as WBT, should be implemented. 
 
Seligman, Steen, Park and Peterson (2005) reported empirical validation 
studies (based on randomised control trials) on the efficacy of five psychological 
interventions to increase individual happiness. One of the investigated 
interventions focused on building gratitude, two focused on increasing 
awareness of what is most positive about oneself, and two focused on 
identifying strengths of character. These interventions were compared to a 
placebo control. The results suggested that increasing awareness of positive 
individual features and practicing signature strengths of character made people 
happier and less depressed for up to six months. Another empirical finding 
reported by Robbins (2008) suggested that the pursuit of hedonic experiences 
(i.e. momentary pleasures) was a non-significant predictor of SWB, while 
eudaimonic experiences, such as engagement in the activities of a person‟s 
day-to-day life, were much better predictors of SWB. “To be engaged, to find 
meaning in that engagement, and to find pleasure through the fulfilment of that 
meaning and engagement is to live a full life” (p. 101). 
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Those findings, which support the theory of flow, give further indications for 
possible interventions that can be provided to the individuals with severe mental 
health difficulties in order to improve their satisfaction with their lives. The theory 
of flow proposes that the states of happiness can only be achieved through 
engagement with the activities of everyday life and through involvement in 
absorbing tasks, such as work or leisure, in which a person exercises individual 
strengths, talents and interests. This engagement, involvement and absorption 
in activities lead to the state of a unique harmony in consciousness, the flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1997, 2002). Given the stigma and social isolation 
which are so often reported to be attached to the label of schizophrenia (e.g. 
Chadwick, 1997; James, 2001; Campbell, 2007), it seems therefore of major 
importance that people with psychosis are encouraged to pursue activities, 
interests and hobbies which they find absorbing, and which they had pursued 
prior to the onset of their difficulties, in order to buffer them against the negative 
emotional consequences of the objective disadvantages. In the context of the 
reported studies, it also seems plausible to argue that the individuals with 
experiences of psychosis need to be assisted in retaining or going back to their 
jobs, in which they could use their strengths. In fact, the central importance of 
activities in recovery from psychosis has already been stressed by the 
Pathfinder Hearing Voices Group (1999), Coleman and Smith (2005), and 
Whitwell (2005). It is not to say, given the study model utilised within the current 
research that these objective changes would automatically lead to the 
improvement in the individuals‟ satisfaction with life. Rather it is to suggest that 
the positive experiences of exercising individual resources would help the 
individuals to buffer against high levels of psychological distress, which in 
consequence would help to increase life satisfaction. Indeed, the present study 
has clearly demonstrated that the objective indicators of quality of life do not 
make people automatically happy or unhappy. Rather, as discussed in detail 
earlier, these are the emotional responses to individual evaluations of personal 
circumstances (cognitive model) and the ability to gradually adapt to adverse 
circumstances (dynamic equilibrium theory) that influence the person‟s 
satisfaction with life. 
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In conclusion, there appear to be three major clinical implications of the 
present study. Firstly, both the replication of the four-dimension model of 
happiness and psychological distress and the results of mediational analyses 
suggest the central role that depression plays in decreasing SWB of an 
individual with psychosis. Therefore, alleviating psychological distress through 
addressing depression within a therapeutic intervention provided for psychosis 
appears essential. For instance, CBT has demonstrated its effectiveness with 
depression, and techniques employed in CBTp appear very similar to those 
used in cognitive therapy for depression. 
 
Secondly, not only alleviation of psychological distress in psychosis seems 
pertinent. From the perspective of Positive Clinical Psychology, interventions 
that aim to increase an individual‟s SWB would lead to a further and lasting 
recovery from psychosis-related distress and protection against a relapse of 
depression. Since it has been demonstrated in the present study that individuals 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia were as capable of experiencing 
positive emotions as any other person from a general population, then Positive 
Clinical Psychology interventions appear applicable, as well. WBT and other 
positive interventions (such as building gratitude or identifying strengths of 
character) have been supported with initial evidence. 
 
Thirdly, more contemporary theories of happiness also seem to provide 
some guidance on possible interventions that might be employed to increase 
SWB of individuals with psychosis. Theory of flow has been presented as a 
possible framework for a range of behaviourally oriented interventions 
increasing the occurrence of optimal experiences. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Several recommendations for future research were already made in the 
paragraph dedicated to the discussion of mediational analyses. The additional 
recommendations will now be discussed. 
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Robbins (2008) argued that due to the nature of eudaimonic understanding 
of character strengths and virtues, positive psychology researchers need to face 
the inevitable epistemological and methodological implications of that 
commitment. In the author‟s opinion, researchers pursuing a positive 
psychology perspective on human experience need to adopt qualitative 
methods in their research and integrate natural scientific and human scientific 
methods of investigation. Given that the experiences of happiness and 
evaluations of life satisfaction are heterogeneous in their nature, that is, as 
argued by Argyle (2001), different people have different values and objectives in 
their lives, it appears logical to suggest that qualitative studies should follow the 
current research. The present study was an initial attempt to test the 
suppositions of one of the SWB models amongst individuals with psychosis. 
Since the patterns of interactions between psychological distress with 
happiness were replicated from the general population, it now appears pertinent 
to establish how individuals with severe psychological difficulties perceive their 
own levels of life satisfaction, how they think their levels of happiness are 
affected by their experiences of psychosis, what they do and what they find 
useful in elevating their levels of happiness, and what interventions they receive 
that they find helpful in increasing satisfaction with their lives. Qualitative 
methods of scientific enquiry would therefore appear appropriate to investigate 
these topics. 
 
Since the potential applicability of positive psychology interventions (e.g. 
WBT) were argued in the thesis, an empirical investigation of this argument 
needs to be undertaken. As suggested by Basu (2004), “the ultimate purpose of 
health interventions is to enhance the quality of life” (p. 35). Therapeutic 
practice of applied positive psychologists therapeutic aims to privilege clients‟ 
resilience rather than their shortcomings and enhance their control in areas that 
matter to them in order to increase their ability to explore the future from an 
optimistic perspective (Carr, 2005). Gable and Haidt (2005) stated that there is 
an ultimate need for positive psychology to develop effective interventions to 
increase and sustain wellbeing in the individuals. Joseph and Linley (2006) 
argued that positive clinical psychology should focus on helping individuals with 
enduring psychological difficulties adapt to adverse and threatening events, and 
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facilitate growth after adversity (adversarial growth). Unfortunately, these 
remain merely arguments and, in order to extend the positive psychology focus 
onto the disadvantaged and stigmatised individuals with severe mental health 
difficulties, these arguments need to be supported with empirical evidence. 
Such evidence would encourage the utilisation of positive therapeutic 
interventions in daily clinical practice with people who experience psychosis, 
and help them to achieve and maintain higher levels of SWB in their lives. 
Moreover, as argued earlier in the thesis, the increased happiness and 
satisfaction levels would also have buffering and preventive benefits against 
future episodes of heightened psychological distress. 
 
It has already been established that the experience of illness and its 
treatment might be frightening, disorienting and disabling (Chadwick, 1997). 
The concept of psychological control, i.e. the sense of being prepared for and 
having appropriate means to cope with an impending stressful event, has 
received much attention in positive psychology and led to the development of 
interventions for patients to prepare them for upcoming procedures. For 
instance, Taylor and Sherman (2004) reported some studies which 
demonstrated that how people cope with an illness can affect their subsequent 
psychological and physical health and illness-related behaviour. Since the 
individual perception of control over hallucinations has been argued as one of 
the main determinants of emotional distress in psychosis (e.g. Romme & 
Escher, 1993, Green et al., 2006), it appears important to investigate the 
effectiveness of the positive clinical psychology interventions to increase 
psychological control in people with experiences of psychosis, in order to 
alleviate their distress and increase their wellbeing. 
 
Carr (2005) argued that from a scientific point of view there are great 
possibilities for future research related to testing positive psychology theories 
and models. The author asserted that “there are endless opportunities to 
empirically test hypotheses derived from these theories about the relationships 
between large set variables and well-being” (p. 6). However, given that positive 
psychology starts to have an enormous popular value, because people in 
general are interested in what they can do to be happier, healthier and more 
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fulfilled, there is an immense temptation for positive psychology to descend into 
popularist science. Therefore, as argued by Linley et al. (2006), it is important 
for the positive psychology movement researchers to conduct quality studies 
characterised by methodological rigour and practical relevance. 
 
Ethical Reflection 
 
As argued by Taylor and Sherman (2004) research in the field of 
psychology has focused disproportionately on the negative fallout from acute 
and chronic illness. Maddux et al. (2004) postulated that despite clinical 
psychology‟s deeply entrenched association with medical model, it was time to 
abandon the illness ideology and replace it with a positive clinical psychology‟s 
notions of health, happiness, and human strengths. The present study supports 
this postulation, and aspires to promote the positive psychology approach to the 
particularly disadvantaged individuals with severe psychological difficulties, 
namely to those with experiences of psychosis. 
 
Maddux et al. (2004) argued that the medical model promotes dichotomies 
between normal and abnormal behaviours, between clinical and non-clinical 
problems, and between clinical and non-clinical populations, which seems to 
further isolate and disadvantage people diagnosed with mental illnesses. The 
results of the present research have shown that people with a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia, who given the medical model should present as 
fundamentally different, are very similar to those from so called non-clinical 
population in their abilities to experience happiness. The results, therefore, 
provided some evidence that these dichotomies are misleading and false. 
 
Maddux et al. (2004) argued that conceptions of psychological abnormality, 
along with specific diagnostic categories and labels, are not facts about people 
but merely social constructs, which are abstract concepts reflecting shared 
views that were developed and agreed on collaboratively over time by 
professionals, theorists, researchers, the media and the culture in which all 
were embedded. The meanings of these constructs were negotiated rather than 
discovered or revealed. For these reasons, Maddux et al. (2004) stated that: 
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The various specific categories of mental disorders found in traditional 
psychiatric diagnostic schemes... are not psychological facts about 
people, nor are they testable scientific theories. Instead, they are 
heuristic social artefacts that serve the same sociocultural goals as do 
our constructions of race, gender, social class, and sexual orientation – 
maintaining and expanding the power of certain individuals and 
institutions, as well as maintaining the social order as defined by those 
in the power. (p. 326)  
 
Therefore, as concluded by Maddux et al. (2004), the socially constructed 
illness ideology and associated socially constructed psychiatric diagnostic 
schemes have resulted in the proliferation of mental illnesses and 
pathologisation of human existence. Consequently, as argued by Joseph and 
Linley (2006), professions of clinical psychology, counselling and psychotherapy 
should not be agents of social control, but agents of personal growth and social 
change, and challenge both researchers and applied practitioners to rethink 
their positions in relation to these issues. 
 
The question that needs to be asked here is therefore why the researcher 
used a diagnostic category as the inclusion criterion for the present study? 
Given that one of the initial hypotheses was that the four-dimension model of 
SWB and psychological distress would be replicated within the study sample, 
the implicit idea was to further demonstrate that the dichotomies implied by the 
mental illness ideology, even in the case of such a stigmatising diagnosis as 
this of paranoid schizophrenia, are ambiguous and unhelpful. 
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Appendix A 
Participant Information Sheet 
(Version 2, date: 04/11/2009) 
 
Research title: Satisfaction with Life in Psychosis. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
you need to understand the purpose of the research and what it would involve 
for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. You may wish to talk to your Nurse, Care 
Coordinator, Social Worker or any other person that can provide independent 
advice on your participation. 
 
The first part of the information sheet explains the purpose of this study and 
tells you what will happen to you if you take part. The second part gives you 
more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Please feel free 
to ask your Psychologist any additional questions regarding this research 
project. Should you wish to talk to the researcher this can be also arranged for 
you. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
PART I. 
 
1. Purpose of the study and its background. 
 
Experiences such as hearing voices and having thoughts of being followed or 
persecuted by others are typical symptoms of psychosis. These are often 
accompanied by low mood and anxious feelings decreasing person‟s 
happiness and life satisfaction.  
 
The aim of this research is to understand in what way the experiences 
mentioned above affect how satisfied people are with their lives. There have 
not been any previous studies looking into this subject, therefore the project 
aims to address this particular gap in the current knowledge. 
 
2. Why have I been invited? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because your Psychologist 
believes your experiences will contribute to our research, and we hope that you 
may agree to share them. 
 
3. Do I have to participate? 
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No. Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide 
whether you want to take part or not. Should you agree to participate, we will 
then ask you to sign a relevant consent form. You are free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason. If you decide not to participate, this would not 
affect the standard of care you receive. 
 
4. What will happen to me if I participate and what will I need to do? 
 
Should you decide to take part, you will be asked to complete three brief 
questionnaires. This normally takes 15-20 minutes in total. The questionnaires 
will ask you a number of questions about your current feelings and how 
satisfied you are with your life. You can complete the questionnaires during 
your next appointment. 
 
5. Are there any disadvantages of taking part in the study? 
 
Completion of the questionnaires might make you think more about your life. 
Sometimes, when you answer the questions you may realise that you are not 
entirely satisfied with your life, which might make you feel sad. If you become 
distressed at any point of the study, please talk to your Psychologist about 
these feelings. 
 
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There is no direct benefit of participating in this study. However, by agreeing to 
take part in the study you will help other Psychologists to have a better 
understanding of how satisfied the service recipients are with their lives. In the 
future, this may also help other people with experiences similar to yours feel 
happier and more satisfied. 
 
7. What happens when the research study stops? 
 
The research data generated by the study will be analysed and will form an 
important part of the researcher‟s doctoral thesis.  
 
8. What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study will be 
addressed. If you are considering participation, please see Part II of this sheet 
for more information. 
 
9. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
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Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice guidelines and all information 
about you will be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part II. 
 
If the information in Part I has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please read the additional information in Part II before making any 
decision. 
 
PART II. 
 
1. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
Your involvement with the study will be brief and will not exceed 15-20 minutes. 
All the data collected will be anonymised. However, if you decide to withdraw 
from the study after completing the questionnaires, you will need to inform your 
Psychologist, and we will securely destroy all the collected information. 
 
2. What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions. The contact 
numbers are listed at the end of this form. If you remain unhappy and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the Lincolnshire Partnership NHS 
Foundation Trust complaints procedure. Details of the procedure can be 
obtained from the clinic or at your ward. 
 
3. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All information which is collected during the course of the research will be 
kept strictly confidential, and all personal and demographic information will be 
anonymised. The consent form signed by you will be filed in your clinical folder. 
Its copy will be locked securely in a filing cabinet at the University of Lincoln 
and will be destroyed after completion of the study. You will not need to write 
your name down on the questionnaires. After you fill them in, you will put them 
into a sealed envelope, which will then be coded and forwarded to the research 
team by your Psychologist. 
 
Your Psychologist will not have any access to the completed questionnaires 
and will not be viewing them. Your participation in the study will have no impact 
on your medical care. 
 
4. Should any other health care professionals be involved? 
 
It is not necessary to seek consent from any other health professional involved 
in your care, as they will not be involved in the study at any point of this 
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research. However, feel free to discuss your participation with anyone who 
might give you an independent advice. 
 
5. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
This study is a major part of the researcher‟s doctoral thesis and the results will 
be published in a relevant scientific journal. The published data will be the 
general outcome of the study and your personal information will not be 
recognisable. If you are interested in what we have found, the overall research 
outcome will be given to your Psychologist on a „Results Information Sheet‟. 
Should you wish to be informed about the results of the research, please notify 
your Psychologist. 
 
6. Who is organising and funding the study? 
 
The study is organised and funded by The University of Lincoln. 
 
7. Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Nottingham 
1 Research Ethics Committee. It has been also reviewed by the research tutors 
at the University of Lincoln including an Academic Research Supervisor, and a 
Clinical Research Supervisor in the NHS. 
 
8. Further information and contact details. 
 
Should you wish to obtain further information, please refer to the following: 
- General information about research – your Clinical Psychologist. 
- Specific information about this research project – Mr Pawel Mankiewicz 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologist) or Mr Colin Turner (Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist): 01522577385. 
- Advice as to whether you should participate – your Nurse, Care Coordinator, 
Care Support Worker, and Social Worker. 
- Who you should approach if unhappy with the study – Mr Pawel Mankiewicz 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologist) or Mr Colin Turner (Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist): 01522577385. 
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Appendix B 
Participant Consent Form 
(Version 2, date: 04/11/2009) 
 
 
 
Title of Project: Satisfaction with Life in Psychosis. 
 
Names of Researchers: Mr Pawel D. Mankiewicz – Chief Investigator 
                                       Mr Colin Turner – Principal Investigator 
 
 
Please initial relevant boxes:  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated  
18/09/2009 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the  
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected.  
 
3. I understand that my participation and all demographic/personal data  
obtained will be anonymised.  
 
4. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected  
during the study, may be looked at by the research team from University of  
Lincoln, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant  
to my taking part in this research.  I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________           ________________            ______________ 
Name of Client                                     Date                                     Signature  
 
 
 
_________________________          _________________           ______________ 
Name of Person taking consent            Date                                   Signature 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Data Sheet 
 
Participant code:...............OP/IP 
Please circle as applicable: 
Gender: Female 
Male 
Age: 18-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70 and above 
Marital status: Single 
Married 
Separated 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Employment status: Employed full-time (30 hrs or more per week) 
Employed part-time 
Unemployed 
Full-time student 
Retired 
Full-time homemaker or carer 
Ethnicity: White British 
White Irish 
White – any other white background. 
Mixed – White & Black Caribbean 
Mixed – White & Black African 
Mixed – White & Asian 
Mixed – any other mixed background 
Asian or Asian British – Indian 
Asian or Asian British – Pakistani 
Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi 
Asian or Asian British – any other Asian background 
Black or Black British – Caribbean 
Black or Black British – African 
Black or Black British – any other Black background 
Other Ethnic Groups – Chinese 
Other Ethnic Groups – any other ethnic group 
 
Categories of ethnicity and employment status based on the IAPT Data Set Questionnaire adapted from: IAPT (2008). 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies outcomes toolkit 2008/9. Relieving distress, transforming lives. Retrieved 
January 19
th
 2010 from http://www.pro-ne.nhs.uk 
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Appendix D 
Letter to Care Co-ordinator 
 
Date: 04/11/2009. 
Version 1. 
 
 
Date: _________  
To: _____________________ 
 
Dear ____________________, 
 
We would like to inform you that Mr/Mrs/Ms ______________ (NHS No: 
_________) has agreed to participate in our study titled „Satisfaction with Life in 
Psychosis‟. The aim of this research is to understand how the positive 
symptoms of psychosis affect how satisfied people are with their lives.  
 
The client‟s participation has been anonymous, and involved completing three 
questionnaires: Brief Symptoms Inventory, Affect Balance Scale, and 
Satisfaction with Life Scale. The study has been founded by The University of 
Lincoln, and constituted an integral part of the Chief Investigator‟s doctoral 
qualifications in Clinical Psychology. 
 
Should you wish to acquire further information about the study, do not hesitate 
to contact us. 
 
 
With kind regards, 
 
 
Pawel D. Mankiewicz                                      Colin Turner 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist                                Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Chief Investigator                                                  Principal Investigator 
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Appendix E 
The Journal of Positive Psychology Guidelines for Authors 
 
1.      Introduction 
It is essential that authors prepare their manuscripts according to established 
specifications. Failure to follow them may result in your paper being delayed 
and the effectiveness of the search capabilities offered by electronic delivery 
will depend upon the care used by authors in preparing their manuscripts. 
Therefore, contributors are strongly encouraged to read these instructions 
carefully before preparing a manuscript for submission, and to check the 
manuscript for compliance with these notes before submitting it for publication. 
2.      Submitting a Paper to The Journal of Positive Psychology 
All submissions should be made online at The Journal of Positive Psychology's 
ScholarOne Manuscripts site. New users should first create an account. Once a 
user is logged onto the site submissions should be made via the Author Centre.  
Please make sure your complete contact address information - including email 
address - is provided at the time of submission. 
3.      General Guidelines 
The Journal of Positive Psychology considers all manuscripts on the strict 
condition that they have been submitted only to The Journal of Positive 
Psychology, that they have not been published already, nor are they under 
consideration for publication or in press elsewhere. Authors who fail to adhere 
to this condition will be charged with all costs which The Journal of Positive 
Psychology incurs and their papers will not be published.  
Contributions to The Journal of Positive Psychology must report original 
research and will be subjected to review by referees. 
Writing your paper  
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 For all manuscripts non-discriminatory language is mandatory. Sexist or racist 
terms should not be used.  
 A typical article will not exceed 7,500 words. Papers that greatly exceed this 
will be critically reviewed with respect to length. Authors should include a word 
count with their manuscript.  
 Each paper should have four to ten keywords.  
 Papers are accepted only in English.  
 Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout including the reference 
section, with wide (3 cm) margins.  
 All the authors of a paper should include their full names, affiliations, postal 
addresses, telephone and fax numbers and email addresses on the cover page 
of manuscripts.  
 Abstracts (150 word maximum) are required for all papers submitted and 
should precede the text of a paper.  
 Manuscripts should be compiled in the following order: title page; abstract; 
keywords; main text; acknowledgments; appendixes (as appropriate); 
references; table(s) with caption(s) (on individual sheets); figure caption(s) (as 
a list).  
 When using a word which is or is asserted to be a proprietary term or trade 
mark authors must use the symbol® or TM or alternatively a footnote can be 
inserted using the wording below:  
This article includes a word that is or is asserted to be a proprietary term or 
trade mark. Its inclusion does not imply it has acquired for legal purposes a 
non-proprietary or general significance, nor is any other judgement implied 
concerning its legal status. 
4.      Copyright 
As an author, you are required to secure permission if you want to reproduce 
any figure, table, or extract from the text of another source. This applies to 
direct reproduction as well as "derivative reproduction" (where you have 
created a new figure or table which derives substantially from a copyrighted 
source). For further information and FAQs, please see 
http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/permission.asp.  
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5.      Style guidelines  
Description of the Journal's article style (see Appendix F). 
Description of the Journal's reference style (please see the internet link: http:// 
www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/style/reference/tf_A.pdf); Quick guide (see 
Appendix G). 
 
Any consistent spelling style is acceptable. Use single quotation marks with 
double within if needed. 
 
If you have any questions about references or formatting your article, please 
contact authorqueries@tandf.co.uk (please mention the journal title in your 
email). 
 
Word templates: Word templates are available for this journal. If you are not 
able to use the template via the links or if you have any other template queries, 
please contact authortemplate@tandf.co.uk 
6.      Free article access 
 
Corresponding authors will receive free online access to their article through 
our website (www.informaworld.com) and a complimentary copy of the issue 
containing their article. Reprints of articles published in this journal can be 
purchased through Rightslink® when proofs are received. If you have any 
queries, please contact our reprints department at reprints@tandf.co.uk 
7.      Page Charges 
There are no page charges to individuals or institutions. 
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Appendix F 
The Journal of Positive Psychology Article Style 
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Appendix G 
The Journal of Positive Psychology References Style 
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Appendix H 
NHS Research Ethics Committee Approval Letter 
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Appendix I 
Research & Development Approval Letter 1 
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Appendix J 
Research & Development Approval Letter 2 
 
 
 
